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INTEGRATION AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT
BY ROBERT L. BIRMINGHAM*
IN THIS PAPER I shall attempt to evaluate the potential impact of eco-
nomic association among underdeveloped countries. Attention is centered
on gain achievable by participating states as a group: world welfare altera-
tion appears devoid of normative implication to the national decision maker,
while questions of internal distribution of union benefit are too complex for
summary treatment. Conclusions of amalgamation efficacy rest jointly on
abstract analysis and deduction from empirical economic parameters; dis-
cussion of trade and development theory is extended beyond that logically




A pressing international problem is the great disparity between real
incomes in the North Atlantic Community and those in the less developed
lands of Latin America, Africa, and Asia. In 1962 per capita gross domestic
product unadjusted for inequalities in purchasing power averaged 2,975
dollars in the United States, but only 145 dollars in the poorer market
economies comprising two-thirds of the population of the free world.'
*ROBERT L. BIRMINGHAM. B.A. 1960, LL.B. 1963, University of Pitts-
burgh; LL.M. 1965, Harvard Law School.
Professor Detlev F. Vagts of the Harvard Law School has been of
great help to me in the preparation of this paper. I am also indebted
to Profesior Gottfried Haberler and Dr. Lawrence Officer of Harvard
University. Errors are my own.
.U.S. Agency for International Development, Selected Economic Data for the Less
Developed Countries, May 1964, p. 8 (Table 1). Other comparisons are equally revealing:
Backward Regions
United States (Free World)
Power per capita 5050 110
(kilowatt hours per year)
Miles of improved roads 1010 70
(per 1000 square miles)
Literacy (per cent) 98 35
Life expectancy (years) 70 45
Daily caloric intake 3220 2230
(per: capita)
People -per physician 740 4400
Ibid. See U.N. DFP'T OF ECONOMIC & SOCIAL AFFAIRs, WoRlD ECONOMIC SURVEY 1963
pt. i, 1 U.N. :Do. No. E/3908(ST/ECA/84) at 18-28 (-1964); Patel, The Economic
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"When... the national income in the United States increases by the modest
figure of 2 Y percent in a year, the average increase in income for each
man, woman, and child is just about equal to the total annual income of
the average citizen of India." 2 While income indices are by no means
comprehensive measures of intercivilization welfare differentials, 3 wide-
spread adoption of materialistic western ideologies has diminished the im-
portance attached to the traditional value structures of non-European
cultures.
Wealth disparity made manifest by increasing international contact
represents a potent source of political tension. The abortive United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development, held in Geneva in the spring of
1964, is best interpreted as a protest by the backward nations against their
plight. In a joint declaration at the conclusion of negotiations, the poorer
participants proclaimed: "The developing countries regard their own unity,
the unity of the seventy-five, as the outstanding feature of this Conference.
. . . The injustice and neglect of centuries need to be redressed. The
developing countries are united in their resolve to continue the quest for
such redress . . . .,4 A South American businessman has asserted: "You
Distance Between Nations: Its Origin, Measurement and Outlook, 74 EcoN. J. 119 (1964).
See also Falk & Mendlovitz, Towards a Warless World: One Legal Formula To Achieve
Transition, 73 YALE L.J. 399, 405 (1964). Some idea of the concern generated by the
problem can be garnered from K611ner, Entwicklungstheorie und Entuwicklungswirklicb-
keit, 15 JAHRBUCH FUR SOZIALWISSENSCHAFT 35 (1964).
Income estimates are hardly reliable. For difficulties of calculation see Kuznets,
Quantitative Aspects of the Economic Growth of Nations, 5 EcoN. DEvELOPMENT & CUL-
TURAL CHANGE 1 (1956). In particular, bias is introduced because indices of traded goods
are generally used to compare price levels, and price difflerentials are greatest among
nontraded items. See Balassa, The Purcbasing-Power Parity Doctrine: A Reappraisal,
72 J. POL. EcoN. 584 (1964).
2 NEL, THE FLOW OF RESOURCEs FROM RICH TO POOR 4 (1961).
3 
"Progress is a much oversimplified notion. Only in the narrow area of material
control and production are the West and the non-Western world properly conceived
of as "more developed" and "less developed"-and only then by making an unreal-
istic abstraction of material wealth from the culture and society in which it sub-
sists. In every other respect the West and the societies of the non-Western world
are not more or less advanced on a single road. They are, and have been, proceeding
in quite different directions of development. They are, and have been, advancing
toward quite different human destinations. Only a Westerner obsessed with the
universal validity of his own values is compelled to look upon the hypersubtle Arab
East, say, as "less developed," and he does so not by consideration of its intentions
and the native accomplishments of its civilization, the intensity and subtlety of its
life, but by assuming that whatever the rest of the world's aberrations and hesitations,
that world is necessarily fated to conform to Western norms."
STILLMAN & PFAFF, THE PoLIncs OF HYSTERIA 39-40 (1964). For an argument that the
current goals of economic development have been formulated in disregard of basic
human needs see Weisskopf, Economic Growth Versus Existential Balance, 75 ETHICS
77 (1965). On the "culture-centric predicament" see Hoyt, Choice as an Interdisciplinary
Area, 79 Q.J. EcoN. 106, 107-08 (1965). See also Bergson, National Income and Welfare
(Rand Corp. Paper P-3004, Oct. 1964).
4 1 U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, FINAL Acr AND REPORT, Annex
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have inundated our market with consumer goods and you have not invested
enough to create national industries here. You arouse our discontent by
putting pretty things in our windows. Now we look to you to satisfy the
needs that all people have a right to. When we see Americans with two
cars we . . . want two." 5 Myrdal argues: "Without a radical change in
policy ... the world is headed for an economic and political cataclysm." 6
Wealth differentials can be satisfactorily reduced only by maintenance
of rapid rates of growth in underdeveloped regions. Between 1950 and
1960, however, output per person in these areas increased only 2.2 per cent
per year, less than in the advanced economies. Although during this period
gross domestic product in the poorer nations grew 4.4 per cent per year,
20 per cent faster than in industrialized lands, population expansion at a
2.2 per cent annual rate dissipated the advantage. 7 As Myrdal notes, "The
B, at 67-68 (1964). Section I of the Preamble of the Final Act of the Conference pro-
claims: "The States participating . . . are determined . . . to seek a better and more
effective system of international economic co-operation, whereby the division of the
world into areas of poverty and plenty may be banished and prosperity achieved by
all. . . . [Ilt is essential that the flows of world trade should help to eliminate the wide
economic disparities among nations." Id. at 3. General Principle Four adds: "[All]
countries pledge themselves to pursue internal and external economic policies designed
to accelerate economic growth throughout the world, and in particular to help promote,
in developing countries, a rate of growth consistent with the need to bring about a
substantial and steady increase in average income, in order to narrow the gap between
the standard of living in developing countries and that in the developed countries."
Id. at 10. The United States was the only participant voting against adoption of this
statement. Id. Annex A, at 18. See Weintraub, After the U.N. Trade Conference: Les-
sons and Portents, 43 FOREIGN Arr. 37 (1964).
5 Quoted in Guzzardi, The Crucial Middle Class, Fortune, Feb. 1962, pp. 98, 212.
See also RAPOPORT, STRATEGY AND CONsCIENCE 261-62 (1964).
"U.S. firms established in Latin America derive approximately 500 million dollars
monthly from profits. In other words, while the U.S. Congress allocates 525 million
dollars for the Alliance for Progress program next year, the United States in one
year extracts from Latin America the sum of six billion dollars in profits through
firms which U.S. capital has established in impoverished Latin American nations.
As can be easily observed, Latin America has its own Alliances for Progress in favor
of the United States, supplying six billion dollars annually toward contributing to
the high living standard enjoyed by the North American people. While the U.S.
debates on loans to be granted to Latin American nations for the construction of
schools, hospitals, roads, and so forth, Latin America is contributing toward the
economic potential of the most powerful country of the world. Considering the
cited figures, which reveal the increasing poverty of Latin America, it is not strange
that the disturbed American hemisphere continues to be jolted by great social
upheavals."
Radio Tribuna, Panama City, Dec. 18, 1963, quoted in Johnson, U.S. Private Investment
in Latin America: Some Questions of National Policy 53 (Rand Corp. Memo.
RM-4092-ISA, July 1964).6 Myrdal, The Widening Gap, Int'l Development Rev., Sept. 1963, p. 3. See CouNcu
ON WORLD TENsIoNs, A SrUDY OF WORLD TENsIoNs AND DEVELOPMENT (1962).
7 U.N. DEP'T OF ECONOMIC & SociAL AFFAIRS, op. cit. supra note 1, at 26. See Witt-
mann, Wirtscbaftlicbes Wachstum in reichern und armen Landern, 177 JAsMIwcHRa rfUR
NATIONALOKONOMIE UND STATISTIK 97 (1965).
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income gap between the rich and the poor countries has.. . been increasing
and not decreasing, not only absolutely but relatively." 8 Seers argues that
"Marx's prophecy of the impoverishment of the poor may be fulfilled on
the international plane." 9 Extrapolation of environmental parameters sug-
gests that if the -underdeveloped market economies continue internal policies
of the recent past they will by 1970 be unable to maintain even the modest
1950-1960 pace of output expansion without roughly 10 billion dollars of
capital inflow annually from their more wealthy neighbors. Raising growth
rates a single percentage point would almost double external assistance re-
quirements.10 Aspirations nevertheless remain high:
"Sheik Abeid Karume, the first Vice-President of the Republic of Tan-
ganyika and Zanzibar, on June 6, 1964, promised the 320,000 people of
Zanzibar that they 'would all be earning f450 by 1966,' an income C25
greater than the 1962 U.K. average. This remarkable objective is to be
achieved by a three-year Zanzibar development plan prepared by the
revolutionary government of Zanzibar. When I questioned an important
figure in the revolutionary government about the feasibility of this
promise, he replied, 'If the Government says it will happen, it will,'
and eagerly dropped the subject. The Chinese People's Republic has
already promised Zanzibar an interest-free loan of f 5 million, but this
is, unfortunately, only about 1 per cent of the investment required to
reach the promised per capita income level." 11
Oil export has thus far provided the only mechanism permitting rapid
accumulation of wealth by non-Western societies. A World Bank survey
reports: "Kuwait has reached the level of affluence where purely economic
improvement, in the form of a higher per capita income for her people,
need not be an overriding objective of national policy." 12 Two decades
ago Kuwait was a sparsely populated 6,000-square-mile wasteland at the
northeast corner of the Persian Gulf. Per capita income was but 35 dollars;
public revenues totaled only 290,000 dollars. Today annual imports of luxury
goods amount to almost 300,000,000 dollars, or roughly 825 dollars for each
of its 350,000 inhabitants. The cost of salaries of public officials is about
1,120 dollars per citizen. Each tree and bush along the streets requires 250
dollars per year in maintenance expenditures. The Kuwait Fund for the
8 Myrdal, supra note 6, at 3, 11.
9 Seers, A Model of Comparative Rates of Growth in the World Economy, 72
EcoN. J. 45, 75 (1962).
10 U.S. Agency for International Development, Development Policies and Assistance
Requirements, Dec. 1964 (preliminary draft).
"Keegan, Tanganyika's Five-Year (1964-1969) Development. Plan: .Sober Realism
or Buoyant Optimism?, in FINANCNG AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT 11, 12 n.3 (Farer ed.
1965).
12 INT'L BANK FOR RECONSTRUcTIoN &- DEVELOPMENT,, THE ECONOMIC DEVEtOPMENT
oF KuWAIT 1 (1965).
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Economic Development of the Arab Countries has capital resources of
840,000,000 dollars. Yet the unskilled laborer earns only 1.5 dollars per day.
The 1957 census revealed an indigenous labor force of almost. 24,000, of
which over 19,000 had at best rudimentary training. Most of the remainder
were designated "professionals and technologists," although they included
only one chemist, one geologist, two doctors, two author-journalists, and
eight accountants. Also in this category were 156 "clergymen." 13
B. Constraints Limiting Development Velocity
In pioneering studies of economic growth in the decade following the
Second World War, attention was focused on the Harrod-Dornar model,
in which the assumption of fixed factor proportions dictated that given a
plentiful labor supply and an invariant, capital-output ratio, production
would be directly proportional to the quantity of capital available.1x4 Stimu-
lation of increases in investment levels became the planner's primary goal:
"In the literature on economic development and in public statements by
leaders of underdeveloped countries, emphasis is always placed on the need
for more and more capital." 15
The introduction of the more realistic neo-classical model permitting
substitution between capital and labor inputs demonstrated that such em-
phasis on a single variable was misplaced. 6 Extensions of this analysis have
1 3 Shehab, Kuwait: A Super-Affluent Society, 42 FOREIGN Ar'. 461 (1964). See also
Schmidt, Affluence in Kuwait, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1965, p. 5, col. 1. Contrast HIGGINS,
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 26-37 (1959), with Smith, Wealth in Libya Flowing Like Oil,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1965, p. 47, col. 1. On national wealth as a possible inducement to
political liberalism see Habachy, A Study in Comparative Constitutional Law: Constitu-
tional Government in Kuwait, 3 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 116 (1965). Note the dif-
ficulty of even approximately positioning the described government on the democratic-
totalitarian continuum on the basis of supplied data.
14 See HARROD, TOWARDS A DYNAMIC ECONOMICS (1948); DOMAR, ESSAYS IN THE
THEORY OF ECONOMIC GROWTH (1957).-
15.Bruton, Growth Models and Underdeveloped Economies, 63 J. PoL. EcoN. 322,
335 (1955), reprinted in THE ECONOMICS OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT 219, 240 (Agarwala &
Singh eds. 1958). "In recent years too much emphasis in the discussion of growth has
been devoted to one of the factors concerned, namely investment." Clark, The Funda-
mental Problems of Economic Growth, 94 WELTWIRTSCHAFTmIcHEs ARCHLY 1 (1965).
16 See Solow, A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth, 70 Q.J. EcoN.
65 (1956). See also MEADE, A NEO-CLASSICAL THEORY OF ECONOMIC GROWTH (2d ed.
1962); SoLow, CAPITAL THEORY AND THE RATE OF RETURN (1963); Symposium on Produc-
tion Functions and Economic Growth, 29 REv. EcoN. STUDIEs 155-266 (1962). For
critical comment see Riese, Mittelfristiges wirtschaftliches Wachstum und neoklassische
Wachstumstheorie,- 18 KYKxos 80 (1965).
The current rage is the constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) production func-
tion, introduced in Arrow, Chenery, Minhas & Solow, Capital-Labor Substitution and
Economic Efficiency, 43 REV. ECON. & STATISTICS 225 (1961). For a detailed discussion of
its derivation and characteristics see .Scheper, Produktionsfunktionen mit konstanten
Substitutionselastizitdten, 177 JAHRBbCHER FUR NATIONAL6KONOMIE UND STATISTIK 1 (1965).
See generally Hahn & Matthews, The Theory of Economic Growth: A Survey,
74 EcoN. J. 779 (1964). This 123-page review contains a 232-item bibliography.
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illustrated the possibility that long-term consumption levels may be nega-
tively influenced by policies encouraging a continuing massive investment
effort. Over an indefinite time interval greatest possible total consumption
will result if capital expansion is limited to the rate of profit; a steady invest-
ment flow exceeding this amount will boost the capital-output ratio to
such an extent that the resulting rise in future income will be less than the
increase in saving necessary to maintain the selected rate of growth of
production. Once a certain level of development is attained, technical prog-
ress replaces capital accumulation as the major factor inducing advance in
per capita income. 17
Recent work has stressed social aspects of development: "Kapitalbildung
[ist] nicht Impuls, sondern Erscheinung des Wachstums .... Tiefer gefasst
muss ... alle wirtschaftliche Entwicklung auf den primiren Faktor schlecht-
hin zuriickgefiihrt werden: auf menschliche Leistungen." 18 Traditional cul-
17 If Y, C, I, and K represent income, consumption, investment, and capital stock
respectively, we may write:
C = Y - I = Y - dK.
It follows that
KC = Y- - -dK.
If W represents dK the rate of capital accumulation,
K
C = Y - WkK.
Differentiating with respect to K and setting the result equal to 0 we obtain:
aC aY
-K = W -K 0
or
W k = -
a K
Riese, Gleichgewicbtswacbstum und optimnales Wachstunz in der neoklassischen Wachs-
tun Tbeorie, 17 KYKLos 31 (1964). See VON WEIZSXCKER, WACHSTUM, ZINS UND OPrI-
MALE INVESTITIONSQUOTE (1962); Bombach, Optimales Wachstum und Gleichgewichts-
wacbstwn, in HENN, BOMBACH & B6VENTER, OPTIMALES WACHSTUM UND OPTIMALE
STANDORTVERTEILUNG 47 (1962); Krelle, Investition und Wachstum, 176 JAHRBiCHER FUR
NATIONAL6KONOMIE UND STATISTIK 1 (1964); Richter, 'Harrod-Wachstum' und 'Solow-
Wacbsturn', ein Vergleich, 121 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DIE GESAMTE STAATSWISSENSCHAFT 235
(1965). See also Samuelson, A Catenary Turnpike Theorem Involving Consumption and
the Golden Rule, 55 AM. ECON. REV. 486 (1965). But see Sato, Fiscal Policy in a Neo-
Classical Growth Model: An Analysis of Time Required for Equilibrating Adjustment,
30 REV. EcoN. STUDIES 16 (1963).
18 Paulson, Sachkapital und Human Capital in der wirtschaftlicben Entwicklung,
120 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DIE GESAMTE STAATSWISSENSCHAFT 577, 588 (1964). (Emphasis in
original.) "While investment of capital is undoubtedly necessary for economic growth,
it is certainly not the controlling or predominant factor. Economists are not yet in a
position to analyse this matter fully, but we can say that the principal factors in economic
growth are not physical-natural resources and invested capital-but human." Clark,
supra note 15, at 2. See BooN, ECONOMIC CHOICE OF HUMAN AND PHYSICAL FACTORS IN
PRODUCTION (1964).
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tural patterns generated in periods of economic stagnation frequently prove
incompatible with the dynamic acquisitiveness necessary to material prog-
ress.19 Capital equipment is of little value unless complemented by a skilled
labor force:
"Among the preconditions of industrialization, therefore, I believe
that the major difficulty lies in the absence of a population with suffi-
cient experience in the use of money and credit and with inadequate
skill on a large scale to manage or operate industrial enterprise. What
this means is that the pace of industrialization is inexorably linked to
the pace of adult training and education and the fostering of migration
to the nation involved of persons already trained and capable of training
others.
"Everything else can be resolved by appropriate legal structures, but the
problems of training and education cannot be resolved by fiat." 20
In Africa "in 1960 less than 1 percent of the population had received a
secondary education and less than 10 percent primary education." 21
In general, growth speed can be restricted either by limited export
earnings or by low domestic saving ratios: an industrializing state is de-
19 "The widespread personal and social habits, attitudes and customs of large sectors
of the Indian population-the caste system, the veneration of the cow, the reluctance
to slaughter animals, the contemplative, uncurious and fatalistic outlook-have con-
tributed in large measure to her backwardness, and unless they are modified or aban-
doned, capital investment cannot hope to be as productive of output and incomes as
in western countries." Clark, supra note 15, at 5. See HAGEN, ON THE THEORY OF SOCIAL
CHANGE: How ECONOMIC GROWTH BEGINS (1962); MCGLELLAND, THE ACHIEVING SOCIETY
(1961); Morgan, The Achievement Motive and Economic Behavior, 12 ECON. DEVELOP-
MENT & CULTURAL CHANGE 243 (1964); Nash, Social Prerequisites to Economic Growth
in Latin America and Southeast Asia, 12 ECON. DEVELOPMENT & CULTURAL CHANGE 225
(1964); Reynaud, Wirtscbaftspsycbologie und Entwicklungsforschung, 91 WELTWIRT-
SCHAFTLICHES ARCHlV 231 (1963); Schatz, n Achievement and Economic Growth: A
Critique, 79 Q.J. ECON. 234 (1965); McClelland, Reply, id. at 242; Schatz, Rejoinder, id.
at 246. But see Hill, Growth and Investment According to International Comparisons,
74 EcoN. J. 288 (1964).
20 Mentschikoff, Federalism and Economic Growth, in FEDERALISM AND THE NEW
NATIONS OF AFRICA 191, 196, 199 (Currie ed. 1964). Up to 40% of American national
income growth between 1929 and 1956 has been attributed to investment in education.
For a review of such estimates see Bowman, Schultz, Denison, and the Contribution of
"Eds" to National Income Growth, 72 J. POL. ECoN. 450 (1964). See also Symposium:
Investment in Human Beings, 70 J. POL. ECON. 1-157 (Supp. 1962). "[Tlhe rate of return
on investment in 'human capital,' however measured, may be at least as large as that on
physical capital .... I am tempted to conclude: If I was given the economic dictator-
ship of a country, charged with the task of ensuring a maximum rate of growth, I
would be prepared to risk my posthumous fame by betting heavily on education and
research-under the motto: 'Mind over machine.'" Aukrust, Factors of Economic
Development: A Review of Recent Research, 93 WEL-VIRTSCHAFrLcHES ARCHiv 23, 41
(1964). (Footnote omitted.)
21 Lewis, A Review of Economic Development, 55 Am. EcoN. REV. PAPERS & PROC.
1, 7 (1965).
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pendent upon importation of foreign capital equipment to provide a foun-
dation for a manufacturing sector; a poor nation must use a very high
proportion of what income it is able to generate to furnish its people with
the basic necessities of life. 22 Albeit with some inconvenience, other pur-
portedly independent constraints can frequently be incorporated into one
of these dichotomous categories: a deficiency in worker skill, for example,
must be remedied through import of trained labor or investment in human
capital requiring saving undifferentiated from that needed to expand the
stock of producer goods. Admittedly many social aspects of the revolution
inherent in the process of industrialization can hardly be usefully delineated
in quantitative terms; for purposes of initial orientation, nevertheless, it is
convenient to abstract from distortions and discontinuities produced by in-
stitutional rigidities.
This posited bifurcation is itself not unobjectionable, although if applied
as a tool of analysis the assertion that "the two approaches are complement-
tary rather than competitive and, under proper definitions, they should
give identical results" 23 misleadingly exaggerates their interrelationship. A
proportion of export gains will be saved; and it is frequently possible par-
tially to compensate for unavailability of needed foreign capital goods
through increased levels of domestic investment, even though substitution
22 "The ease with which people can procure food, the primary necessity, deter-
mines the amount of labor and other resources that they can devote to industry
and culture. A population that must devote 95 percent of its resources to feeding
itself will have fewer allocable resources for other pursuits than will one of equal
size that must devote only 90 percent to procuring necessities. The latter society
can grow twice as fast at the outset, and the resulting capital accumulation will
constantly raise the proportion of resources which it can use for further develop-
ment. After a time, therefore, the two populations will occupy entirely different
economic and cultural levels. When one considers that many societies today spend
practically their total resources is securing the barest necessities of life, while others
spend less than 10 percent for needs of the same urgency, observed differences in
the levels of development of the two groups are not surprising ....
TRAvis, THE THEORY OF TRADE AND PROTECTION 243 (1964).
2 Balassa, The Capital Needs of Developing Countries, 17 KYKLos 197 (1964).
The author justifies his statement through appeal to the familiar identities describing
equilibrium in an open economy:








If = net capital inflow
Ibid. The equalities, indisputably correct, are of some value used in the context of a
discussion of the impact of foreign aid. They nevertheless depict only ex post relation-
ships, and are thus incapable of indicating the dynamics of the adjustment process which
produced them.
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costs may be disproportionate or lengthy delay may be required. 24 The
distinction nevertheless provides a convenient. framework for exploration
of the potential of alternative programs designed to overcome -growth
barriers.
C. Parameters and Prospects
1. Capital Transfer
The levels of constraints of both types can be raised by inflow of
capital. from industrial areas. While inadequate to support proposed am-
bitious growth programs, current resource transfers to backward regions
are not insubstantial: in 1963, for example, they exceeded eight billion
dollars. The United States alone provided 58 per cent of this sum. Grants
by governments accounted for more than half of disbursements, and much
of the remainder consisted of soft loans of public funds. Over two-thirds
of the 1.5 billion dollars loaned by the United States to emerging nations
in 1963 earns less than one per cent interest.2 5 Private capital transfer, almost
entirely in the form of direct investment, totaled 1.8 billion dollars. 26 In
1960, inflow of six billion dollars amounted to 3.5 per cent of national in-
comes of recipient states and was associated with a quarter of their total
growth. A decade earlier only two billion dollars was provided. Capital
receipts averaged four dollars per inhabitant throughout the poorer portion
of the free world in 1958: Southeast Asians and Africans gained 2.3 and six
dollars respectively, while the Latin American and Middle Eastern inflow
2 If unlimited quantities of labor and raw materials are available and the supply
of land is fixed, the assumption of rigid factor proportions would imply a production
function of the Harrod-Domar type:
P = min. (aKI, BKf) a<O, j6>0
Here. P, Kd, and Kf represent production, domestic capital goods, and imported capital
goods respectively, and a and 9 are parameters. Output growth is restricted by deficien-
cies in Kf or in K8 and Kf jointly, depending on whether foreign currency or invest-
ment funds generally are lacking. See McKinnon, Foreign Aid Constraints in Economic
Development and Efficient Aid Allocation, 74 EcoN. J. 388 (1964).
Substitution opportunities may be incorporated into the formulation through use
of the CES production function:
P = a[6Kd -P.+ (1 -6)Kf-P]-- 6 > 0, 1 -6 > 0. P > -1
where a, 8, and p are parameters. See McKinnon, supra at 405; Guha, Scarcity of
Specific Resources as a Limit to Output, 30 Rav. EcoN. STUDtEs 37 (1963). On problems
of parameter estimation see Seers, Normal Growth and Distortions: Some Techniques
of Structural Analysis, 16 OXFORD EcoN. PAPERs 78 (1964).
25For a recent survey of the institutional framework of intergovernmental lending
.see House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, Staff Memorandum on International Lending and
Guarantee Programs, 88th Gong., 2d Sess. (1964).
26 ORGANISATION -FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND, DEVEOPMENT, DEVELOPMENT
AssisTANcz EFFORTS AND PoLicrxs:- 1964 -REvIEw 102-03, 108-09, 110 (Tables 1, 5, 6)
(1964).
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exceeded seven dollars per person. Between 1956 and 1959 these funds pro-
vided 14 per cent of transferee foreign exchange resources.2 7
Although the political nature of foreign aid decisions precludes con-
fidence in projections of current trends, the possibility of dramatic increase
in the availability to underdeveloped states of capital at noncommercial
prices appears remote. Lewis states: "IT]he future of foreign aid is now
critically in doubt, not only in the United States, but even in France, where
aid has hitherto been sacrosanct." 28 Interest rates on private loans, which
must reflect the uncertainties inherent in any long-term international trans-
action, are frequently prohibitively high. Nor is investment by nonnationals
a panacea. The governments of backward countries often feel that unless
closely regulated, participation in domestic ventures by the alien entre-
preneur may be a more costly source of funds than borrowing:
"In such a sheltered market, almost every new industry has possibilities
of a fourfold growth or so in ten years. Moreover, the dividend policy
of Indian companies is to pay around 10 per cent per annum. This is
necessary to maintain a good credit standing in the stock markets. Thus
it is not unusual to derive a 400 per cent return in equity investment in
ten years. This creates no difficulty for the planners and policy makers
of India insofar as domestic equity investment is concerned, for with
proper tax and other policies, consumption can be dissuaded and re-
investment encouraged with respect to these high profits. But foreign
equity investment presents another problem. It is India's policy, and
one which she intends to maintain, to allow free remittance of profits
and repatriation of capital, including capital gains, to foreign enterprise
in India. In view of this policy, India feels it must be prepared to return
in ten years $5.00 for every dollar it allows as foreign equity invest-
ment. On the other hand, a ten-year loan at 6 per cent interest would
require a foreign exchange repayments burden of only $1.60 to $1.00." 29
A justified fear of expropriation raises demanded profit levels and limits
2 7 WHITMAN, GOVERNMENT RISK-SHARING IN FOREIGN INVESTMENT (1965); Leduc,
International Aid and Growth, in PROBLEMS IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 139, 156-57 (E.
Robinson ed. 1965); Lewis, A Review of Economic Development, 55 Am. ECON. REv.
PAPERS & PRoc. 1, 2 (1965).
2 8 I d. at 4. See Belair, Foreign Aid: Program Faces Mounting Challenge at Home,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1965, § E, p. 3, col. 1.29 KuST, FOREIGN ENTE"RRISE IN INDIA 55 (1964). A more traditional view is in
disagreement: "Capital to be used for machinery acquisition will probably have to be
available in hard currency. There are three sources of such capital. The best is from
an export balance of trade because it is earned by the nation involved itself. The next
best is investment or equity capital, since it need not be repaid .... The third is com-
mercial lending, Which has the disadvantage of requiring repayment .. " Mentschikoff,
supra note 20, at 194. See Rothwell, The Extra Borrowing Costs of Fixed-Return Over
Equity Foreign Capital, 11 INDIAN EcoN. J. 311 (1964). See also Ball, Capital Imports
and Economic Development: Paradoxy or Orthodoxy?, 15 KYKLOS 610 (1962); Kaizuka,
A Remark on Capital Imports and Economic Development, 17 KYKLos 483 (1964);
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the magnitude of ventures undertaken.30 Earnings are frequently less than
is commonly supposed: "The average rate of return of U.S. manufacturing
Massell, Exports, Capital Imports and Economic Growth, 17 KYKLos 627; Ball, Capital
Imports and Economic Growth: A Reply, 18 KYKLOS 139 (1965).
At present the developing economies owe in excess of $30 billion to their indus-
trialized neighbors. In 1962 external public debt service costs in Argentina, Brazil, and
Chile were 22.8, 24.2, and 27.6% of export receipts respectively; 30% of 1964 aid flows
to poorer nations were offset by interest charges. Weintraub, The Foreign-Exchange
Gap of the Developing Countries 18-19 (Princeton Univ. Essays in International Finance
No. 48, Sept. 1965).
For a discussion of additional problems posed by the activities of foreign enter-
prise in backward countries see Johnson, U.S. Private Investment in Latin America:
Some Questions of National Policy (Rand Corporation Memorandum RM-4092-ISA,
July 1964). Distrust of the traditional capitalistic forms of market organization is com-
mon in emerging nations. See FRIEDLAND & ROSBERG, AFRICAN SOCIALISM (1964); NARAYAN,
SOCIALISM IN INDIAN PLANNING (1964); Berg, Socialism and Economic Development in
Tropical Africa, 78 Q.J. EcoN. 549 (1964); Hazard, Negritude, Socialism and the Law,
65 CoLUM. L. REv. 778 (1965). "Socialism is the road to social freedom .... The path
of the revolution, which is the path of socialism, is an inevitability dictated by historical
reality and by the broad aspirations of the masses . .- . Action to increase national
wealth cannot be left to the improvisations of exploiting private capital and its mad
whims which are motivated only by the selfish desire for profit." United Arab Republic
Information Dep't, Declaration of Agreement for Federal Union of the United Arab
Republic, Syria, and Iraq: Social and Economic Constituents, April 17, 1963, reprinted
in 2 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 559, 565, 566 (1963).
'0Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 84 Sup. Ct. 923, (1964). See
Falk, The Complexity of Sabbatino, 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 935, 939-42, 943 (1964); Comment,
The Act of State Doctrine After Sabbatino, 63 MICH. L. REV. 528, 534, 537-38 (1965).
For an interesting example of an arrangement providing partial compensation see
Switzerland-United Arab Republic Compensation Agreement for Nationalizations, June
20, 1964 (effective Nov. 1, 1964), 2 FEUILLE FiDiRALE 952 (Switzerland 1964), translated
in 3 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1125 (1964) (effective Nov. 1, 1964).
See FATOUROS, GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES TO FOREIGN INVESTORS (1962); WHITE,
NATIONALISATION OF FOREIGN PROPERTY (1962); House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, Ex-
propriation of American-Owned Property by Foreign Governments in the Twentieth
Century, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print 1963), reproduced in 2 INT'L LEGAL MATERI-
ALS 1066 (1963). "Every country has the sovereign right .. . freely to dispose of its
natural resources in the interest of the economic development and well-being of its
own people." I U.N. CoNFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, FINAL ACT AND REPORT
10 (1964) (General Principle Three). See Gess, Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural
Resources, 13 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 398 (1964); U.N. SECRETAUAT, THE STATUS OF PERMA-
NENT SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATIONAL WEALTH AND RESOURCES & REPORT OF THE CoM-
MISSION ON PERMANENT SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATIONAL RESOURCES, U.N. Doc. Nos.
A/AC.97/5/Rev.2, E/3511, A/AC.97/13 (1962).
"International law does not consider the nature of property rights nor does it
regulate property relations within a state. Under international law states are sover-
eign, therefore only municipal and not international law can regulate all matters
connected with the acquisition, transfer and loss of ownership rights, including the
loss of ownership under the terms of a nationalization law. This cannot become
a subject for discussion by another state. The laws of the state carrying out the
nationalization, and not international law, determine the conditions under which
property is taken from private persons and in particular to whom the law extends,
whether or not compensation shall be paid, etc., etc. This postulate applies equally
to the property of aliens."
Vilkov, Nationalization and International Law, 1960 SOVIET YB. INT'L L. 58, 78 (English
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industries in Latin America after depreciation was 3.6 per cent for 1962
compared with 8.8 per cent in the United States and 11.3 per cent in West-
em Europe. Over 1957-62, these average rates were 6.6 per cent, 8.7 per
cent and 14.9 per cent, respectively." -3
2. Sales Abroad
Export earnings of less-developed countries are expected to expand at
an annual rate of between 3.7 and 4.9 per cent during the next five years.3 2
Although promoting increase in these receipts would appear the obvious
method of acquiring foreign exchange sufficient to permit import of capital
equipment needed for accelerated domestic development, prospects are
poor for rapid growth in this sector.
Demand for commodities produced at a comparative advantage in
backward regions is generally both price and income inelastic.3 3 Rapid ex-
pansion of output of many of these goods would merely cause price de-
clines so extensive that total revenue would itself be lowered: in the coffee
market, for example, a mere 10 per cent increase in supply with demand
unchanged would induce a price fall of almost a third.3 4 Here a policy
advantageous to the individual nation is disastrous when adopted universally.
summary), quoted in Fatouros, International Law and the Third World, 50 VA. L. Rxv.
783, 808 (1964). See N.V. Vereinigde Deli-Maatschappijen v. Deutsch-Indonesische
Tabak-Handelsgesellschaft m.b.h., Ct. App. Bremen, Aug. 21, 1959, 9 ARCHIV DES VOLKER-
RCuTS 318 (1961), 28 Int'l L. Rep. 24, 35 (1963). The court maintained "that there
should be no compensation in cases of nationalization of colonial investments." Fried-
mann, Act of State: Sabbatino in the Courts and in Congress-Remarks, 3 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 103, 106 (1965). See also FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRucIr u OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 318-21 (1964).
On the impact of programs of creditor nations insuring investment in underdevel-
oped lands against expropriation see WMTMAN, THE UNITED STATES INVESTMENT GuAR-
ANTY PROGRAM AND PRIVATE FOREIGN INVESTMENT (1959); Johnson, The Course of US.
Private Investment in Latin America Since the Rise of Castro 20-24 (Rand Corp.
Memo. RM-4091-ISA, May 1964). For a discussion of the threat of deprivation of
foreign aid as a deterrent against nationalization see Lillich, The Protection of Foreign
Investment and the Hickenlooper. Amendment, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 1116 (1964). In spite
of impediments the extent of our private commitments in backward areas is striking:
"in 1955 the export sales of U.S. owned enterprises accounted for about 30 per cent
of total Latin American exports." Johnson, supra at 20-24.
31 Hasson, Book Review, 55 AM. EcoN. REv. 564, 565-66 (1965).
32 U.S. Agency for International Development, Development Policies and Assistance
Requirements, Dec. 1964, at 11-5 (preliminary draft). For estimates of comparable
magnitude with smaller range see BALASSA, TRADE PRospEcrS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
94 (1964). See also Pincus, Commodity Policy and Economic Development (Rand
Corporation Memorandum RM-3887-ISA, Oct. 1963).
33 See KRELLE, PREISTHEORiE 3-8 (1962).
34 The calculation is based on an estimated price elasticity of -. 25. Data from the
United States, which alone accounts for /2 of world imports, yield an elasticity between
-. 2 and -. 3. BALASSA, TRADE PRoSPE 's FOR DEVELOPING CoUNTRIES 199; FAO, THE
WORLD COFFEE ECONOMY 31 (1961). Equivalent figures have been obtained for Argentina,
Canada, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland, and the Federal Republic of Germany. ibid.:See
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As standards of living rise a smaller proportion of total income is spent on
food and on other raw material intensive commodities: "[T]he total con-
sumption of wheat in the United States has been fairly stable since the
beginning of the twentieth century despite the tremendous expansion in
population and increase in real per capita incomes during the period." a5
Technical progress may reduce raw material input by improving process
efficiency or by allowing substitution of synthetics. In the United States in
the first half of the present century the amount of coal required to generate
one kilowatt-hour of electricity fell from 7.05 to 1.19 pounds. a6
Politically necessary tariff and quota barriers in wealthier lands fre-
quently preclude imports from backward regions even where substantial
comparative advantage exists:
"[D]eveloped countries have their own domestic sources of supply of
many primary commodities and the tendency has been for them to be-
come more self-sufficient rather than less.
"It has been estimated, for example, that in the United States total con-
sumption of twenty-six primary commodities excluding petroleum rose
by 35 per cent from 1927-29 to 1955-57, while imports of the same
commodities increased only 17 per cent. In Western Europe consump-
tion of these commodities also advanced 35 per cent during this period,
but the volume of imported supplies rose only 9 per cent-even less
than in the United States." 37
Farmer protection and subsidization permitted the United States, burdened
with surpluses, to export agricultural products valued at 6.1 billion dollars
also Lehberr, Die Auswirkungen der Kaffeesteuer auf den Kaffeeverbrauch in der Bun-
desrepublik Deutschland, 91 WELTWRTSCHAFTLicHES ARCmiv 327 (1963), and studies cited
therein. The absolute value of the ratio rises as per capita income falls and may be
between -. 5 and -. 7 where earnings per person are as low as $100 annually: approxi-
mations of -. 61 and -. 40 have been calculated for Italy and Greece respectively. FAO,
op. cit. supra at 31 (1961).
3 5
.DELL, TRADE BLOCS AND COMMON MARKETS 176-77 (1963). Studies based on
United States statistics yield coffee income elasticities between .2 and .3 or around .5,
depending on periods selected and whether time series or budget data are used. FAO,
op. cit. supra note 34, at 31-33 (1961). Three separate analyses reveal an approximately
unitary West German proportion. Lehbert, supra note 34, at 327. Figures of .77, .57,
and .26 have been derived for Italy, Finland, and Sweden. Cross-country comparisons
show income elasticity declining sharply as income rises: per capita earnings of $400,
$500, $750, and $1000 per year are associated with elasticities of 3.0, 1.8, 1.1, and .8
respectively. FAO, op. cit. supra note 34, at 31-33 (1961).
The assertion that the demand for food products is income inelastic, formalized
as Engel's law, may be countered in part by a reminder that agricultural production is
subject to the law of diminishing returns because of the limited quantity of the imput
land. See Haberler, An Assessment of the Current Relevance of the Theory of Com-
parative Advantage to Agricultural Production and Trade, 4 INT'L J. AGRARIAN Arr. 130,
136-38 (1964).
36 DEL, TRADE BLOcs AND COMMON MARKETs, 176, 177 (1963).
3 7 d. at 178.
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in the fiscal year 1963-1964.38 Competitive pressures in the labor-intensive 3 9
world textile industry recently led to a trade-restricting international agree-
ment under GATT auspices.40 Domestic measures supplement world con-
straints:
"The Federal Government has long subsidized cotton growers. Then,
when exporters complained that the farmers' subsidy priced American
cotton out of overseas markets, the U.S. started subsidizing exporters.
And last year, after textile mill owners protested that the exporters'
subsidy permitted foreign mills to buy U.S. cotton cheaper than Amer-
ican mills could, the Johnson Administration pushed through Congress
a subsidy for the mills.
"So far, the textile industry has received a mouth-watering $329 million
in subsidies; payments have even gone to prisons whose convicts work at
weaving....
"The overall cotton program was advertised as costing $448 million dur-
ing its first year. Instead, it is now expected to amount to nearly $800
million.... By last week the Commodity Credit Corp. owned a record
7,372,000 bales at a cost of $1.2 billion, on which storage charges alone
run another annual $30 million." 41
38 U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, Foreign Agricultural
Trade of the United States, July-Aug. 1964, p. 2. See also Janson, Myrdal Sees Farm
Surplus End With US. Producing for World, N.Y. Times, March 16, 1965, p. 15, col. 1.
Economic theory posits that in general a country will export those commodities
using most intensively the factors of production with which it is relatively well endowed.
See OHIUN, INTERREGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1933). Nevertheless a careful
study has concluded that America, hardly obviously poor in capital, exports goods
which are labor intensive relative to imports. Leontief, Domestic Production and Foreign
Trade: The American Capital Position Re-Examined, 97 PRoc. AM. PHILOSOPHICAL
SoC'y 332 (1953), reprinted in 7 EcONOMIA INTERNAZIONALE 9 (1954); Leontief, Factor
Proportions and the Structure of American Trade: Further Theoretical and Empirical
Analysis, 38 Rxv. EcoN. & STATISTICS 386 (1956). Attempts to explain the "Leontief
paradox" have recently been directed toward exploration of the possibility of reversals
of the factor intensity rankings of commodity pairs under alternative factor endowment
assumptions. See MINHAS, AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF FACTOR COSTS AND FACTOR
USE (1963); Leondef, An International Comparison of Factor Costs and Factor Use-
A Review Article, 54 AM. EcoN. REv. 335 (1964); Robinson, Factor Prices Not Equal-
ized, 78 Q.J. EooN. 202 (1964); Michaely, Factor Proportions in International Trade:
Current State of the Theory, 17 KYmLos 529 (1964). On the problem in general see
especially TRAVIS, Tim THEORY OF TRADE AND PROTECTION (1964). See also Clemhout,
Efficiency, the Heckscber-Oblin Theorem and Patterns of International Trade as Ex-
emplified by the Leontief Paradox, 17 ECONOMIA INTERNAZIONALE 1 (1964); Ford, The
Oblin-Heckscher Theory of the Basis of Commodity Trade, 73 EcoN. J. 458 (1963);
Kreinin, Comparative Labor Effectiveness and the Leontief Scarce-Factor Paradox, 55
AM. EcoN. REv. 131 (1965); Mathur, Gains in Economic Growth From International
Trade-A Theoretical Explanation of Leontief's Paradox, 16 KYKLOs 609 (1963).
89 See Bhalla, Investment Allocation and Technical Choice-A Case of Cotton
Spinning Techniques, 74 EcoN. J. 611 (1964).
40 Long-Term Cotton Textiles Arrangement Enters Into Force on 1 October, Press
Release GATT/711, Oct. 1, 1962.
41 Time, March 5, 1965, pp. 21-22.
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Barriers are not confined to a narrow range of goods: "The Americans
encouraged us to diversify our industry and not concentrate on just a few
items like textiles or toys or radios. We followed this advice, but now that
we want to sell our new products to America the voices of the protectionists
oppose us." 42
Fluctuation in exchange earnings, intensified by extreme specialization
in the export sectors, can render hazardous the initiation by developing
economies of long-term investment projects even though expected receipt
averages would be sufficient to permit completion. International guarantees
against sharp falls in import-purchasing ability have been impeded by the
desire of backward nations to obtain aid grants in the guise of insurance
and by the unwillingness of the industrialized states to commit themselves
to future assistance expenditures of uncertain magnitude.43
Coffee shipments account for roughly 7.5 per cent of purchases by the
North Atlantic Community from underdeveloped states.4 4 During the sum-
mer of 1962 representatives of the United States and 57 other countries,
meeting in New York under the auspices of the United Nations, negotiated
the International Coffee Agreement,45 a treaty designed to permit control
of the market for this commodity through regulation of its export. By April
6, 1964, the Agreement had been ratified or acceded to by 30 exporting
countries representing 93.2 per cent of world coffee exports and 17 import-
42 Statement by Japanese trade official, quoted in Sklarewitz, Japan Grows Angrier
With U.S. Over Curbs on Nippon Commerce, Wall Street J., July 8, 1965, p. 1, col. 4
(Midwest ed.).
Where tariff rates on raw material imports are low, higher duties on products
manufactured from these commodities impede processing prior to exportation. Balassa,
Tariff Protection in Industrial Countries: An Evaluation, 73 J. POL. EcoN. 573 (1965);
Johnson, The Theory of Tariff Structure, With Special Reference to World Trade and
Development, in JOHNSON & KENEN, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT 9 (1965).
4 See CoPpocK, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC INSTABILITY (1962); MICHAELY, CONCEN-
TRATION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1962); U.N. DEP'T OF ECONOMIC & SOCIAL AFFAIRS,
op. cit. supra note 1, at 140-74; Bauer & Yamey, Organized Commodity Stabilization
With Voluntary Participation, 16 OxFoRD ECoN. PAPERS 105 (1964); Hemmi, International
Commodity Agreements: Reality and the Future, 2 DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 358 (1964);
Kaldor, Stabilizing the Terms of Trade of Under-Developed Countries, Econ. Bull.
Latin Am., March 1963, p. 1; MacBean, The Short-Term Consequences of Export In-
stability ,to Underdeveloped Countries, in MONTGOMERY & SMITHIES, op. cit. supra note
28, at 170; Massell, Export Concentration and Fluctuations in Export Earnings: A Cross-
Section Analysis, 54 AM. ECON. REv. 47 (1964); Stem, International Compensation for
Fluctuations in Commodity Trade, 77 Q.J. EcoN. 258 (1963); Symposium: The Quest
for a Stabilization Policy in Primary Producing Countries, 11 KYKLOS 139-243 (1958);
Symposium: Stabilization and Development of Primary Producing Countries, 12 KYKLos
271-401 (1959). For an extreme example of production variability see Bottomley, Stability
of Income and Employment in an Underdeveloped Desert Community, 17 ECONOMIA
INTERNAZiONALE 301 (1964).
"U.N. DEP'T oF ECONOMICS & SocLx AFFAIRS, op. cit. supra note 1, at 57, 66.
4 5 International Coffee Agreement, Sept. 28, 1962, 14 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 1911, T.I.A.S.
No. 5505 (1964) (effective Dec. 27, 1963). See U.N. Coffee Conference, Summary of
Proceedings, U.N. Doc. No. E/CONF.42/7, 8 (1962).
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ing countries representing 86.5 per cent of world coffee imports.46 Imple-
menting legislation assuring American participation was signed by President
Johnson on May 24, 1965.47
3. Import Substitution
Whereas export earnings are often discouragingly unresponsive to
domestic strategy, purchases abroad may be controlled by planners with rela-
tive ease. Reduction of imports of consumption commodities either by
means of high duties restricting quantities demanded or through encourage-
ment of creation of internal sources of supply permits a greater proportion
of acquired foreign exchange to be employed to obtain products essential
to the growth process. The new external tariff of the Central American
Common Market will tax imported consumer goods at an average ad valorem
level of 82.5 per cent, with individual rates as high as 150 per cent; in con-
trast, the levies on raw materials and machinery will average only 32 and
5 per cent respectively. 48 As development progresses, substitution will also
be possible in the capital goods sector itself, and increasing autarky will
diminish the impact of limited export potential. Import-competing industries
are however a product of expansion: development difficulties include the
problem of their establishment. 49
4. Domestic Saving
Economic development has been characterized by Lewis as a "process
by which a community which was previously saving and investing 4 or 5
per cent of its national income or less, converts itself into an economy
where voluntary saving is running at about 12 to 15 per cent of national
46FAO, FAO COMMODiTY REviEw 1964, at 73 (1964).
47 N.Y. Times, May 25, 1965, p. 57, col. 3.
"sCentral American Customs Union, Address by Edwin Alcantara, International
Economic Relations Seminar, Harvard University, March 22, 1965.
"In general, low import duties, ranging from an equivalent of zero to 15 percent
ad valorem, were fixed for raw materials and capital goods. For agricultural and
industrial machinery, the maximum rates were not to exceed five percent ad valorem.
For luxury products, and for consumption goods whose early production in Central
America was deemed desirable, the duties were set in a range between 100 and 150
percent ad valorem. On the other hand, for those imported consumption items
whose production by regional manufacturers was not possible, the limits were set
at 25 to 50 percent ad valorem."
Prncus, THE CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMON MARKET 78 (1962). For the advantages of
replacement of tariff restrictions by protection through subsidization of domestic pro-
ducers see Johnson, Tariffs and Economic Development-Some Theoretical Issues, 1 J.
DEVELOPMENT EcON. 3 (1964).
49 See MEiER, LEADING ISSUES IN DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIcS 297-303 (1964); Economic
Comm'n for Latin America (ECLA) and Banco Nacional do Desenvolvimento Econ6mico
(BNDE) Joint Development Center, The Growth and Decline of Import Substitution
in Brazil, Econ. Bull. Latin Am., March 1964, p. 1; Macario, Protectionism and Indus-
trialization in Latin America, Econ. Bull. Latin Am, March 1964, p. 61.
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income or more." "I Rostow's five-stage model isolates a "take-off" phase
of rapidly accelerated growth during which "the proportion of net invest-
ment... rises ... to over 10 per cent [of net national product (NNP) ]." 51
Since marginal propensities to consume are substantially below average pro-
pensities, increases in per capita income will raise the level of the saving
constraint. Growth at an accelerating rate will be possible unless precluded
by unavailability of required foreign exchange or a rising capital-output
ratio.52
In the past, internal acquisition of funds needed to commence this
process has required oppression of the laboring classes by an elite to an
extent incompatible with current American concepts of democratic equal-ity.53
Under a totalitarian regime, the power of the administrating group to
raise saving levels is limited only by its ability to enforce its policies and by
the need to maintain the productivity of workers and peasants: "Communism
is a system for inducing people to produce more and eat less." 5 In China
50Lewis, Economic Development With Unlimited Supplies of Labour, 22 MAN-
CHESTER SCHOOL Ecow. & SOCIAL STUDIES 139, 155 (1964), reprinted in THE ECONOMICS
OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT 401, 416 (Agarwala & Singh eds. 1958).
5 1 RosTow, THE STAGES OF ECONoMIc GROWTH 37 (1960). See also THE ECONOMICS
oF TAKE-OFr INTO SUSTAINED GROwTH (Rostow ed. 1963); Berrill, Historical Experi-
ence: The Problem of Economic "Take-Off," in EcoNoMIc DEVELOPMENT WITH SPECIAL
REFRENcE TO EAST AstA 233 (Berrill ed. 1964); Fishlow, Empty Economic Stages?,
75 EcoN. J. 112 (1965); Shrimali, Professor Rostow's Leading Ideas in Economic Growth,
11 INDIAN ECON. J. 427 (1964); Tsiang, A Model of Economic Growth in Rostovian
Stages, 32 ECONOMETRICA 619 (1964).
52 See Fei, Per Capita Consumption and Growth, 79 Q.J. EcoN. 52 (1965).
r See de Schweinitz, Free Enterprise in a Growth World, 29 So. EcoN. J. 103
(1962). Although the author argues that "economic freedom is a function not only of
the structure of economic organization, but of economic growth as well," id. at 110,
critics have stated:
"His position is that economic growth at low levels of per capita income depends
on increases in stocks of resources. These increases can be realized only by forcing
the masses to save through coercive institutional changes. Under the usual condi-
tions of economic backwardness, growth will occur only if a minority imbued
with a growth perspective creates the institutions favorable to growth. From this
reasoning he concludes: first, that doubt is cast upon the ability of the free enter-
prise system to initiate and sustain growth; and second, that growth must mean
a temporary decrease in economic freedom for the masses."
Laird & Wallace, Free Enterprise in a Growth World: Comment, 30 So. EcoN. J. 268
(1964). See de Schweinitz, Free Enterprise in a Growth World: Reply, 30 So. ECoN.
J. 271 (1964). On the contradictory tendencies toward absolutism and pluralism created
by the growth process see SELF-GovERNMENT IN MODERNIZING NATIoNs (Pennock ed.
1964); DE SCHWEINITZ, INDUSTRIALIZATION AND DEMOCRACY (1964); WITFOGEL, ORIENTAL
DESPOTIsM (1957); Eisenstadt, Breakdowns of Modernization, 12 EcoN. DEVELOPMEN-r
& CUrLTURAL CHANCE 345 (1964).
54 Wright, Development of a General Theory of International Relations, in THE
ROLE OF THEORY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 15, 41 (Harrison ed. 1964). See Chapman,
Trends in Consumption in the Soviet Union (Rand Corp. Paper P-2388, March 1964).
"Es scheint wie ein Naturgesetz, dap Wirtschaftsplaner eine niedrigere Diskontrate als
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in 1933 gross investment amounted to 5 per cent of domestic expenditure;
in 1957 it totaled approximately 25 per cent, but per capita consumption
was at least 10 per cent lower.55
Capitalism in Great Britain during its industrial revolution masked ex-
treme economic inequities beneath a liberal institutional facade: here in
1880 fully 48 per cent of total personal income was received by only 5 per
cent of the population; today this most prosperous segment obtains only
18 per cent.56 The wage laborer does not enjoy the slave's protection of
employer concern for preservation of his capital investment. The Sadler
Committee appointed by Parliament in 1832 to examine working conditions
recorded this testimony:
"Have you worked in a mill from your youth?-Yes, since I was 5
years of age.
"Were you hired for any length of time when you went?-Yes,
my mother got 15s. for six years, I having my meat and clothes.
"What were your hours of labor, as you recollect, in the mill?-In
the summer season we were very scarce of water.
"But when you had sufficient water, how long did you work?- We
began at 4-o-clock in the morning and worked till 10 or 11 at night; as
long as we could stand on our feet.
"Were you kept on the premises constantly?-Constantly.
"Locked up?-Yes, locked up.
"Night and day?-Night and day; I never went home while I was
at the mill.
"Do the children ever attempt to run away?-Very often.
"Were they pursued and brought back again?-Yes, the overseer
pursued them and brought them back.
"Did you ever attempt to run away?-Yes, I ran away twice.
"And you were brought back?-Yes; and I was sent up to the mas-
ter's loft, and thrashed with a whip for running away.
"Do you know whether the children were, in point of fact, com-
pelled to stop during the whole time for which they were engaged?-
Yes, they were.
die Konsumenten haben. Wenn die Planer fast unbeschrinkte M6glichkeiten haben, die
Konsumentenzietpiiferenz durch ihre eigene zu ersetzen, wie in der Sowjetunion, so
werden sin das Konsumniveau auf ein Minimum herunterdriicken, soweit es die
Produktivitt der Arbeit und die politische Stabilitit erlauben." Gehrels, Wachstum
durch Investition in Wissenschaft und Bildung, 94 WELTWIRTSCHAFTLICHES ARCHIV 215,
225-26 (1965).
55Klein, Book Review, 55 Am. EcoN. REv. 575, 577 (1965). See Eckstein, On the
Economic Crisis in Communist China, 42 FOREIGN AFF. 655 (1964); Perkins, Centraliza-
tion and Decentralization in Mainland China's Agriculture, 1949-1962, 78 Q.J. EcoN.
208 (1964).
56 Ojha & Bhatt, Pattern of Income Distribution in an Underdeveloped Economy:
A Case Study of India, 54 Am. ECoN. REv. 711, 717 (1964). See 1 MARx, CAPITAL ch.
10 (1867).
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"By law?-I cannot say by law; but they were compelled by the
master; I never saw any law used there but the law of their ownhands .... ,, 57
Large internal income disparities in backward states allow some indi-
viduals in the community to save large proportions of their receipts. Our
surprise on learning that domestic saving in the Congo has exceeded 20
per cent of national output 58 is mitigated on discovery of earnings distribu-
tion data: in 1950 the 11.5 million natives and 56,000 nonindigenous residents
of the region had average per capita incomes of 23 and 2,946 dollars respec-
tively.59 In Latin America in 1962 the most prosperous 5 per cent of the
population of the average country received 33 per cent of all income; in
Europe between 1949 and 1955 and in the United States around 1961 the
corresponding figures were 22 per cent and 20 per cent respectively.60
"In Guatemala, 516 farms (0.15 per cent of all farms) contain 41 per
cent of the agricultural land; in Nicaragua, 362 owners control over
one third; in Ecuador, 705 units (0.17 per cent) control 37 per cent.
In Venezuela, 74 per cent of the farm acreage, comprising 6,800 units
(1.69 per cent of all farms) is in holdings of over 1,000 hectares. In
Brazil, half the farm land is in the hands of 1.6 per cent of the owners,
while in Peru, 1.4 per cent of the landowners hold 62.8 per cent. In
57VOICES OF THE INDUsTRIAL REVOLUTION 86 (Bowditch & Ramsland eds. 1961). A
factory overseer testified:
"Q. At what time in the morning, in the brisk time, did these girls go to the mills?
"A. In the brisk time, for about six weeks, they have gone at three o'clock in the
morning and ended at ten or nearly half past at night.
"Q. What intervals were allowed for rest and refreshment during those nineteen
hours of labor?
"A. Breakfast a quarter of an hour, and dinner half an hour, and drinking a quarter
of an hour.
"Q. Was any of that time taken up in cleaning the machinery?
"A. They generally had to do what they call dry down; sometimes this took
the whole time at breakfast or drinking.
"Q. Had you not great difficulty awakening your children to the excessive labor?
"A. Yes, in the early time we had to take them up asleep and shake them.
"Q. Had any of them any accident in consequence of this labor?
"A. Yes, my eldest daughter . . .the cog caught her forefinger nail and screwed
it off below the knuckle.
"'. Has she lost that finger?
"A. It is cut off at the second joint.
"Q. Were her wages paid during that time?
"A. As soon as the accident happened the wages were totally stopped."
ENGLISH EcONOMIc HIsT-oRY-SELcTw DocUMENTs 510 (Tawney, Bland & Brown eds.
1914). For a contrasting view see CAPITALISM AND THE HisTORIANs (Hayek ed. 1954).
5 A. Robinson, Introduction, in ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FOR AFRICA SouTH OF TmE
SAHARA at ix, xii (A. Robinson ed. 1963).
59 Bezy, Belgian Congo, in EcoNoMic DEvELOPMENT 184, 211 (Pepelasis, Mears &
Adelman eds. 1961).
60 U.N., THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF LATIN AmmucA iN m PosT-WAR PERIOD,
U.N. Doc. No. E/CN.12/659/Rev.l (1964).
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Chile, some 3,000 farms of 1,000 or more hectares occupy almost 75 per
cent of the farm land." 61
In Panama in 1959, "twenty taxpayers accounted for 65 per cent of total
income tax collections." 62 Exchange controls and assurances of domestic
entrepreneurial opportunities can divert this wealth from Swiss accounts to
development programs. 63
Although primitive conditions render systems of taxation both eco-
nomically disruptive and costly to administer, public revenues must remain
an important source of investment funds. Duties on exports are popular
because collection poses few difficulties; levies on imports combine equal
ease of enforcement with favorable balance of payments effects. Heavy ex-
cise taxation of luxury goods, such as automobiles, may reduce expenditures
of the rich without seriously damaging incentives through prevention of
conspicuous consumption: the prestige value of a Rolls-Royce is determined
not by its cost of manufacture but by its selling price. Finally, saving may
be forced at the cost of the dislocations of inflation simply by printing the
money needed for public investment purchases. 64
D. Reactions
The poor prospects for dramatic economic advance by less-developed
nations through autonomous action and the limited quantities of assistance
available from industrialized states have combined with a recent sharp shift
in terms of trade 65 in favor of manufactured products to induce widespread
6 1 NEHEMKIS, LATIN AMERICA: MYTH AND REALITY 159 (1964). See Karst, Latin-
American Land Reform: The Uses of Confiscation, 63 MicH. L. REV. 327 (1964).
62 Maxwell, Book Review, 55 Am. EcoN. REv. 601 (1965).
63 See IMF, FIFTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT ON ExcHAGcE RESTRICTIONS (1964); Marshall,
Exchange Controls and Economic Development, in EcoNoMic DEVELOPMENT FOR LATIN
AMERICA 430 (Ellis ed. 1961).
64 See MEIER, LEADING ISSUES IN DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 169-228 (1964); INFLATION
AND GROWTH IN LATIN AMERICA (Baer & Kerstenetzky eds. 1964); Ellis, Price Stability:
The Conflict Between Growth and the Control of Inflation, in EcoNoMic DEVELOPMENT
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO EAST ASIA 255 (Berrill ed. 1964); Mamalakis, "Forced
Saving" in Underdeveloped Countries. A Rediscovery or a Misapplication of a Con-
cept?, 17 ECONOMIA INrERNAzIONALE 403 (1964); Mueller, Structural Inflation and the
Mexican Experience, 5 YALE ECON. ESSAYS 145 (1965); Seers, Inflation and Growth: A
Summary of Experience in Latin America, Econ. Bull. Latin Am., Feb. 1962, p. 23.65 See Haberler, Terms of Trade and Economic Development, in ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT FOR LATIN AMERICA 275 (Ellis ed. 1961); Morgan, Trends in Terms of
Trade, and Their Repercussions on Primary Producers, in INTERNATIONAL TADsE THEORY
IN A DEVELOPING WORLD 52 (Harrod & Hague eds. 1963); Schultz, Economic Prospects
of Primary Products, in ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FOR LATIN AMERICA 308 (Ellis ed.
1961).
This general term masks a profusion of measurement formulae. Most popular be-
cause of ease of calculation is the commodity terms of trade ratio, simply
P.
Pm'
where P represents price and the subscripts x and m refer to exports and imports
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rejection of the tenets of traditional trade theory.66 In their place have been
substituted models of exploitation and progressive immiseration 67 which
promise redemption through industrialization: "What alchemy was to the
Middle Ages, industrialization is to the underdeveloped world of this cen-
tury-the magic elixir that can transform feudal societies." 68 Thus Prebisch
differentiates a "center" of industrial lands from a "periphery" of retarded
regions and argues obscurely that monopolistic labor unions and disparities
in "technological density" concentrate the benefits of production advances
in the former areas.69 Myrdal has similarly used the inherently unobjection-
respectively. The gross barter terms of trade, today little used, may be defined as
QmQ '
where Q stands for quantity. The income terms of trade, an expression of the value
of exports in terms of imports which has been frequently employed by the United
Nations Economic Commission for Latin America, is
PQ.
Pm






respectively, incorporate productivity alterations; although they provide a useful
guide to welfare changes, data permitting computation are frequently unobtainable.
See HABELER, A SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE THEORY 24-29 (1961).
61For an introduction to the attacked dogma see KINDLEBERGER, INTERNATIONAL
EcoNoMIcs (3d ed. 1963). Three further texts, listed in order of increasing com-
plexity, are Rose, THEORIE DER AuSSENWIRTscHAs-r (1964); VANEK, INTERNATIONAL TRADE:
THEORY AND ECONOMIC POLICY (1962); KEMP, THE PURE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
(1964). See also CAVES, TRADE AND ECONOMIC STRucruRE (1960); CORDEN, RFCNT
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1965); HABERLER, op. cit. supra
note 65; MEADE, THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (1951 & 1955);
Bhagwati, The Pure Theory of International Trade, 74 EcoN. J. 1 (1964).
For a discussion of free trade doctrines as propaganda designed to render accepta-
ble to all advantages accruing to economically dominant nations as a result of unregulated
international intercourse see J. RoBINsON, ECONOMIc PHILOSOPHY 62-66 (1963). "The
hard-headed Classicals made no bones about it. . . . [T]hey were in favor of Free
Trade because it was good for Great Britain, not because it was good for the world."
Id. at 124.
" See Bhagwati, Immiserizing Growth: A Geometrical Note, 25 REV. EcoN.
STUDIES 201 (1958).
" NEEMKIS, op. cit. supra note 61, at 185. See id. at 185-204.
69 See Flanders, Prebisch on Protectionism: An Evaluation, 74 EcoN. J. 305 (1964).
See also Baer, The Economics of Prebisch and ECLA, 10 EcoN. DEVELOPMENT & CUL-
TURAL CHANGE 169 (1962); Flanders, The Economics of Prebisch and ECLA: A Com-
ment, 12 EcoN. DEVELOPMENT & CULTURAL CQuNEc 312 (1964); Baer, Reply, 12 EcoN.
DEVELOPMENT & CULTURAL CHANGE 315 (1964); Hyde, A Critique of the Prebisch
Thesis, 16 ECONOMIA INTERNAZIONALE 463 (1963). See Prebisch, Commercial Policy in
the Underdeveloped Countries, 49 AM. EC6N. REv. 251 (Supp. 1959); Prebisch, The
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able 70 "vicious circle" concept so successfully employed in his study of the
American Negro 71 as a basis for poorly substantiated condemnation of the
present world economic structure.72 Most neverthless reject autarky: "As
we see nowadays in South-East Asia or the Caribbean, the misery of being
exploited by capitalists is nothing compared to the misery of not being ex-
ploited at all." 73
The intemperate embrace of iconoclastic ideologies is reminiscent of
the blind enthusiasm evoked by religious movements generated by van-
quishment in intercultural strife. On a lower level the most fascinating mani-
festation of uncomprehending despair produced by interaction between
primitive communities and the technologically advanced West is the cargo
cult. In many parts of Melanesia large followings have been obtained by
prophets predicting the arrival of supplies of presently unobtainable manu-
factured products which will be distributed at no cost to the indigenous
populations. "Those in the coastal villages have built wharves out into the
sea, ready for the ships to tie up, and those in land villages have constructed
airstrips out of the jungle for the planes to land. And they have waited in
expectancy for the .. .Coming of the Cargoes." 74
Traditional international trade analysis posits a system of static balance;
while the logic of its theorems is impeccable, they have in general little
relevance to the dynamic problems of development.7 5 Chenery asserts:
"Growth theory contains at least four basic assumptions about under-
developed economies that differ sharply from those underlying the
comparative cost doctrine: (1) factor prices do not necessarily reflect
opportunity costs with any accuracy; (2) the quantity and quality of
factors of production may change substantially over time, in part as a
result of the production process itself; (3) economies of scale relative
to the size of existing markets are important in a number of sectors of
Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal Problems, Econ. Bull. Latin
Am., Feb. 1962, p. 1. "Industrialization became the new religion of Latin America. Its
latter-day high priest is the distinguished Argentine Rail Prebisch." NE ,is, op.
cit. supra note 61, at 186.
70 For a clever study of equilibrium at unacceptable levels see LEIBENsTElN, Eco-
NOMIC BACKWARDNESS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (1957).
71 MYRDAL, AN AMEzRICAN DmEMMA-THE NEno PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY
(1944).
72 MYRDAL, ECONOMIC THEORY AND UNDER-DEvELoPED REGIONS (1957).
73 J. ROBINsoN, op. cit. supra note 66, at 45.
74 FiRT, ELEMErS OF SOCIAL ORGANIZATION 112 (1951), quoted in HmSCHMAN, Tim
STRATEGY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 94 (1958). See LANTEtNA~i, THE RELIGIONs OF THE
OPPRESSED 161-90 (1963); LAWRENCE, ROAD BELONG CARGO (1964).
7' "[Bioth static neo-classical analysis of the allocation of given resources between
various uses, and Keynesian short-period analysis of how given resources are employed,
appear quite inadequate. A dynamic long-run analysis of how resources can be increased
in now what we require." J. ROBINSON, Op. cit. supra note 66, at 100.
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production; (4) complementarity among commodities is dominant in
both producer and consumer demand." 76
Esoteric doctrines are however not required to highlight the difficulties
confronting emerging nations. So long as marginal propensities to import
of these states remain above those of advanced countries equilibrium in in-
ternational development requires continuation of wealth divergence. 7
7
Among the five members of the Central American Common Market, for
example, the income elasticity of import demand averages 1.7: for every
dollar increase in national income, an additional 1.7 dollars is expended on
foreign merchandise. 78  Further rapid expansion of the world output of
primary commodities can only lead to price declines, falling terms of trade,
and diminished productivity levels.
Viner has claimed: "The real problem in poor countries is not agricul-
ture as such, or the absence of manufactures as such, but poverty and back-
wardness, poor agriculture, or poor agriculture and poor manufacturing....
In many countries, the most promising field for rapid economic develop-
ment lies in agriculture . . . ., 79 Elkan nevertheless supports a preference
for development of manufacturing capacity over stimulation of primary
commodity output with the following arguments:
"(1) In primary production increasing quantities of capital and labour
are usually combined with a stock of natural resources which is fixed
or grows at a slower rate. This leads to diminishing marginal physical
product (diminishing returns) per unit of additional capital and/or
labour.
"(2) Manufacturing not only escapes diminishing returns to any notica-
ble extent but also offers significantly increasing returns to scale.
76 Chenery, Comparative Advantage and Development Policy, 51 AM. EcoN. REV.
18, 20-21 (1961). For comment on this position see Haberler, An Assessment of the
Current Relevance of the Theory of Comparative Advantage to Agricultural Production
and Trade, 4 INT'L J. AGRARIAN Aiv. 130, 145-48 (1964); Rodwin, Choosing Regions
for Development, in FRIEDRICH & HARRIS, PUBLIC POLICY 141, 145-49 (Grad. School of
Pub. Admin., Harvard Univ. No. 12, 1963), reprinted in REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND
PLANNING 37, 41-45 (Friedman & Alonso eds. 1964). Two recent monographs dealing
with the relationship between trade and growth are LINDER, AN ESSAY ON TRADE AND
TRANSFORMATION (1961); MEIER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (1963). See
INTERNATIONAL TRADE THEORY IN A DEVELOPING WoRIL (Harrod & Hague eds. 1963);
Haring, Dynamic Trade Theory and Growth in Poor Countries, 16 KYKLOs 371 (1963);
Nurkse, International Trade and Development Policy, in ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FOR
LATIN AMERICA 234 (Ellis ed. 1961).
" See Lurz, THE PROBLEM OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM (1962); John-
son, Economic Expansion and International Trade, 23 MANCHESTER SCHOOL EcoN. &
SOAL STUDIES 95 (1955), reprinted in JOHNSON, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND ECONOMIC
GRowTH 65 (1958); Johnson, Equilibrium Gro'wth in an International Economy, 19
CANADIAN J. EcoN. & POL. Sc. 478 (1953), reprinted in JOHNSON, supra at 120; Takayama,
Economic Growth and International Trade, 31 REV. EcoN. STUDIES 207 (1964).
78 Alcantara, supra note 48.
7 9 ViNRa, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 71-72 (1952).
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"(3) In manufacturing technical progress tends to be faster and more
pervasive than in primary production. The primary sector itself is
technically more progressive in industrialised or industrialising coun-
tries.
"(4) Manufacturing is typically associated with a higher rate of capital
formation and of skill formation than primary production.
"(5) Manufacturing activities generate more and stronger 'backward
and forward linkages' and other external economies than primary pro-
duction, and thereby induce more future investment.
"(6) Industrialisation and its consequences tend to change the value
system of a society in a direction favourable to faster economic
growth." 80
Industrialization, permitting import substitution and export of manufactured
products, appears mandatory for most nations.
II. THE COMMON MARKET AS REMEDY
A. Econocentrism
1. Definitions
Paragraph 8 of article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) provides:
"(a) A customs union shall be understood to mean the substitution of a
single customs territory for two or more customs territories, so
that
"(i) duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce (except,
where necessary, those permitted under Articles XI, XII,
XIII, XIV, XV and XX) are eliminated with respect to sub-
stantially all the trade between the constituent territories of
the union or at least with respect to substantially all the trade
in products originating in such territories, and,
"(ii) subject to the provisions of paragraph 9, substantially the
same duties and other regulations of commerce are applied by
each of the members of the union to the trade of territories
not included in the union;
"(b) A free-trade area shall be understood to mean a group of two or
more customs territories in which the duties and other restrictive
regulations of commerce (except, where necessary, those permitted
under Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XX) are eliminated on
substantially all the trade between the constituent territories in
products originating in such territories." s
80 Elkan, How To Beat Backwash: The Case for Customs-Drawback Unions, 75
EcoN. J. 44, 50 (1965).
81 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. XXIV, para 8, 62
Stat. 2013, T.I.A.S. No. 1765, 62 U.N.T.S. 56.
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Avoidance of problems involved in distinguishing between internally and
externally produced goods and attainment of administrative economies
through elimination of intramarket customs facilities render establishment
of a common external tariff generally advantageous where politically feasi-
ble. The term "common market" normally denotes a customs union within
which "not only trade restrictions but also restrictions on factor movements
are abolished." 82 "An economic union . . . combines the suppression of
restrictions on commodity and factor movements with some degree of har-
monization of national economic policies .... , Although mere economic
cooperation among states has been called "integration," 84 this word is
generally employed only to designate groupings of at least the free trade
level. These terms, together with such nontechnical labels as "amalgama-
tion" and "combination," are frequently used indiscriminately where precise
delimitation of arrangement characteristics is not required. There is with
respect to economic analysis no clear line between mere economic integra-
tion and federation.
The essence of such arrangements is discrimination: disregarding legal
implications of nonadherence to GATT criteria, the degree of liberalization
of intraunion trade is normally analytically unimportant so long as a differ-
ential with respect to third countries is established. The GATT requirement
of substantial elimination of trade restrictions among union partners, designed
82 BALASSA, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 2 (1961).
"A common market incorporates the attributes of a customs union. In addition, it
provides for the elimination of restrictions on the movement of labor and capital
between the participating customs territories and for some harmonization of national
economic policies and institutions (e.g., common labor laws, common agricultural
policies, common banking practices, etc.) through action of the member countries."
PINcus, THE CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMON MARKET 75 n.1 (1962).
The Association of the Bar of the City of New York has asserted:
"The main characteristic of a 'common market,' as opposed to a 'free trade zone'
or the formation of a 'customs union,' lies simply in the extent of the agreement as
to the number of commodities for which trade will be freed. Such a market may
refer to one or several categories of products, as in the case of the European Coal
and Steel Community; may cover all the 'new industries,' as in the case of the
Central American countries; or may even cover all categories of commodities
produced by the signatory countries in which case it becomes, in fact, a 'free trade
zone' or a 'customs union.'"
CoMM. ON FOREIGN LAW, Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
IN LATIN AMERICA 11-12 (1962). This definition appears to have little support in the
literature.
83 BALASSA, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 2 (1961). "An economic union
has the basic characteristics of a common market, but incorporates some cession of
executive power by the member governments to a central authority." PINCUs, THE
CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMON MARKET 75 n.1 (1962).
84TINBERGEN, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION (1965); Balassa, Hacia una
teoria de la integracidn econdmica, in INTEGRACI6N DE AMERICA LATINA 3 (Wionczek
ed. 1964); Haberler, Integration and Growth of the World Economy in Historical
Perspective, 54 AM. ECON. REv. 1 (1964).
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to protect the integrity of the most-favored-nation principle, may be crit-
icized on theoretical grounds. Meade argues that gain from trade creation
and loss from trade diversion depend in part on the height of tariff barriers
prior to amalgamation: where duty rates are not greater than necessary to
exclude all import, they measure international production cost differences
and hence the benefit to be derived from shifts in activity location. Thus
efficiency increase caused by output transfers among partner states will in
general be less substantial in the later stages of a progressive tariff reduction
program, while disadvantage due to abandonment of extra-union sources of
supply should vary only stochastically throughout the adjustment process.
It follows that lowering of duties on trade among associated states is more
likely to produce world welfare gain than is complete elimination.8 5
"[A] partial all-round reduction by the partner countries of their duties
on each other's trade is more likely to do good and less likely to do
harm than is the subsequent total elimination of those duties. In this
sense the case for a system of partial preferences is stronger than that
for a complete customs union.... A mutual reduction of import duties
by the partner countries will expand their mutual trade, but it may also
divert their import and export trades. On the trade expansion there will
always be a gain of welfare; but the gain will be lower, the lower are
the duties on this trade. At each successive reduction of these duties
there will, therefore, be less gain to be reaped from any further expan-
sion of their mutual trade. But since the duties in other countries on the
partners' exports and the partners' duties on their imports from outside
countries remain constant, the loss of welfare on each unit of trade
diversion remains unchanged throughout the process of formation of
the union." 85
2. Theory
The bulk of economic analysis evaluating the impact of the customs
union on international trade has been devoted to exploration of the total
world welfare implications of consequent changes in the extent of specializa-
tion of production in response to the dictates of comparative advantage.
Many early advocates of free trade argued that since uninhibited intercourse
efficiently allocates community resources and since customs unions reduce
8 5 MEADE, THE THEORY OF CUSTOMS UNIoNs 110-11 (1955). See also id. at 50-51;
VANEK, INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THEORY AND ECONOMIC POLIcY 383-84 (1962). For an out-
line of theoretical foundations supporting these conclusions see note 91 infra and ac-
companying text. The recent agreement between the United States and Canada with
respect to free trade in automobiles contravenes the basic GATT standard. See N.Y.
Times, April 6, 1965, p. 49, col. 2. But see LRA, A CANADA-US. FREE TRADE ARRANGEMENT
-- SRvEy OF PossulLE CHARAcmrEIsTIcS (1963).
It seems clear that if tariff barriers are deemed necessary to satisfy balance of pay-
ments constraints a discriminatory duty structure can provide the desired equilibrium at
least cost in terms of interational efficiency. See Joi-JsoN, THE WORLD EcoNoMY AT THE
CRossRoADs 37-48 (1965).
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tariffs, economic association was to be encouraged as movement toward
optimality. Paradoxically, protectionist thinking was frequently in agree-
ment: there was hope that, through integration, markets for nationally
produced commodities could be expanded without a fully compensating rise
in imports. "The literature on customs unions in general, whether written
by economists or non-economists, by free traders or protectionists, is almost
universally favorable to them .... It is a strange phenomenon which unites
free-traders and protectionists in the field of commercial policy ..... 86 In
a pioneering academic inquiry in 1950, Viner formalized these primitive
arguments, demonstrating that although beneficial trade creation through
intraunion production shifts is possible, such adjustments can be outweighed
by harmful diversion of demand from low-cost supply sources in excluded
regions: if some aspects of a system are constrained to nonmaximizing
levels, there is no reason to assert that satisfaction of other conditions of
optimality will necessarily prove advantageous.87 He asserted: "Customs
unions are not important, and are unlikely to yield more economic benefit
than harm, unless they are between sizable countries which practice sub-
stantial protection of substantially similar industries." 88
The normative implications of Vinerian conclusions were soon disturbed
by qualifications arising from consideration of consumption effects. Relaxa-
tion of the unrealistic assumption that goods would be purchased in a given
proportion regardless of relative prices eliminated preclusion of net benefit
from trade diversion in a world where only intranationally produced com-
modities and diverted commodities exist: given competitive conditions, the
impact of purchase expense increase due to transfer of demand to less
efficient sources of supply can be more than offset by utility advantages
derived from universal equation of marginal costs with unit prices.89 Intro-
8 6 VINER, TH- CUSTOMS UNION ISSUE 41 (1950). See the comprehensive bibliography
in id. at 171-211.
1 Lipsey & Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REv. EcoN. STmIES
11 (1956).8 8 VINER, THE CUSTOMS UNION ISSUE (1950). See also Makower & Morton, A Con-
tribution Toywards a Theory of Customs Unions, 62 EcoN. J. 33 (1953). From Viner's
monograph Meade has deduced a procedure for calculating net world gain or loss from
integration programs. If perfectly elastic supply curves and perfectly inelastic demand
curves are posited, a measure of welfare change can be obtained simply by comparing
dollar values of created and diverted trade weighted by cost differences between alterna-
tive supply sources. MEADE, THE THEORY OF CUSTOMS UNIONS 34-36 (1955). See also
Bentick, Estimating Trade Creation and Trade Diversion, 73 EcoN. J. 219 (1963);
Grubel, Estimating Trade Creation and Trade Diversion: A Note, 74 id. 1018 (1964);
Bentick, Estimating Trade Creation and Trade Diversion: Reply and Further Note, id.
at 1020.
89 MEADE, THE THEORY OF CUSTOMS UNIONS (1955); MEADE, PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC
UNION (1953); Gehrels, Customs Unions From a Single-Country Viewpoint, 24 REv.
ECON. STUDIES 61 (1956); Lipsey, The Theory of Customs Unions: Trade Diversion
and Welfare, 24 EcONOMIcA 40 (1957).
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duction into the model of a third good which after union would continue
to be supplied by an excluded nation severely limited the implications of
this analysis by revealing that divergence of cost-price ratios is inevitable. 90
Although inapplicability of the criterion derived to the substantial duty
alterations likely on union establishment severely restricts the value of his
contribution, Meade has shown that, granted a set of highly unrealistic clas-
sical assumptions, the welfare effect of marginal variation in tariff rates can
be computed by subtraction of diverted from created trade values if both
are weighted by their ad valorem burden percentages. 91 The author con-
cludes that chances of amalgamation induced welfare increase are improved
if obstructions to world trade are quantitative restrictions rather than tariffs;
if a high percentage of total economic activity is concentrated in the com-
bining states; if they are initially competitive but potentially complementary;
if prior to unification duties on trade among them are high but the rest of
the world is divided into numerous market areas protected by relatively
unrestrictive barrier systems; and if sources and markets in prospective part-
ner nations supply and absorb large proportions of the imports and exports
traded among them.92
Argument foundations are hardly intuitively obvious: Meade posits
perfect competition, horizontal supply curves,9 3 absence of external econ-
omies and diseconomies and of consumer surplus, cardinal noninterdepend-
ent additive individual utility functions, and constant universally identical
9
°Lipsey, Mr. Gehrels on Customs Unions, 24 REv. EcoN. STUDIES 211 (1957).
91 If p, and c, are price per unit paid by consumers for good i and the production
cost of that good respectively and dX is the change engendered in its physical
quantity, Meade's criterion may be written:
1(pi - ci)dXi.i
MEADE, THE THEORY OF CUSTOMS UNIONS 120-21 (1955).
92 MEADE, THE THEORY OF CUSTOMS UNIONS 107-10 (1955). For further findings
see text accompanying note 85 supra and note 113 infra.
"
3Additional work has further qualified the mounting body of normative con-
clusions through exploration of the impact of posited patterns of increasing marginal
costs. If the lowest cost producer of a commodity is excluded from a union of two
other regions, the duty on the commodity is at no time prohibitive, and the common
external tariff of the union on the commodity is less than the higher of the two levies





where S and P equal quantity supplied and price, t and T represent tariff rates before
and after union, and the subscripts H and L denote symbol applicability to union mem-
bers having higher and lower duties respectively before amalgamation. Spraos, The
Conditions for a Trade Creating Customs Union, 74 EcoN. J. 101 (1964). See also
Mishan, Trade Creating Customs Unions-A Comment, 75 EcoN. J. 238 (1965); Spraos,
Trade Creating Customs Unions-A Rejoinder, 75 EcoN. J. 241 (1965).
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income marginal utilities. 94 Ingenious geometric analysis has enabled Vanek
to derive parallel conclusions from less limiting premises: in particular, mere
ordinal rankings are found sufficient. Although the author deduces that in
general an advantageous union would require participation of at least two-
thirds of the world economy if the external tariff is some average of those
in force in the member states before integration, he asserts that benefit can
always be obtained if excluded nations are compensated for amalgamation
losses through reduction of duties applicable to their exports.9 5
3. Limitations
The main current of customs union theory is thus best characterized
as an expansion of the neoclassical international trade framework to em-
brace discriminatory activities: inclusion of a third country has complicated
the model without altering the approach. "[T] he existing theory of customs
unions is almost completely confined to the specialization of production
according to comparative advantage. Problems of economic growth ... are
ignored." 96 To the development economist, conscious abstraction from
dynamic elements renders findings at best useless and more probably mis-
leading:
"[T]he Viner formula for the evaluation of customs unions is subject
to some grave objections. Like the neoclassical case for free trade, of
which it is a corollary, it assumes fixed preference systems, constant
production functions (technology) and fixed stocks of the factors of
production; in short, it is concerned with making the best of a static
world. Where the principal concern of policymakers is that of achiev-
ing the maximum rate of growth (and this is probably as characteristic
an aim of those in the developed world as of those in the poorer na-
tions), the trade creation and trade diversion aspects of a customs union
may be of relatively little importance. What is wanted, rather, is an
indication of the effect a customs union will have upon changes of
94 Reformulating Meade's index to take account of international disparities in in-
come marginal utility, Vanek derives the measure:Si i Z
E A.(L p. dXN -E Cn dXc),
n i i
where A. represents the marginal utility of income for the nth country and the sub-
scripts n and N denote production and consumption magnitudes respectively. VANEX,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THEORY AND ECONOMIC POLICY 375 (1962).
9 5 VANEK, GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM OF INTERNATIONAL DISCRIMINATION: TiH CASE OF
CusTOMs UNIONS (1965). The complexities encountered in continued extension of
analysis are best illustrated by Vanek's inclusion of a 107-item compendium of "results."
Id. at 211-31.
96 Staley, Costa Rica and the Central American Common Market, 15 ECONOMIA
INTERNAziONALm 117, 122 (1962). See Cooper & Massell, A New Look at Customs Union
Theory (Rand Corp. Papers P-2972, P-2972-1, Oct., Nov. 1964).
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preference systems and upon the rate of growth of technological capa-
bility and the stock of productive factors." 91
Much of the more pragmatic inquiry stimulated by postwar economic
problems of the international community is similarly inapplicable to back-
ward areas. Supporters of integration have stressed resulting heightened
competition, promising both stronger pressures inducing intrafirm cost re-
duction and more rapid growth because of additional innovation incentives.
Welfare gain potential has been attributed to anticipated increase in the
variety of goods available to the consumer.9
8
The implications of Continental amalgamation for underdeveloped
countries have likewise received disproportionate attention. The President
of Uruguay, in a statement expressive of Latin American attitudes toward
preferences offered African nations, has proclaimed: "The formation of a
European Common Market... constitutes a state of near-war against Latin
American exports." 99 There is talk of counterbalancing United States ac-
tion. o0o While expansion of discrimination in favor of former colonies
throughout important segments of the Western market undeniably threatens
the unity of the third world and is obviously economically detrimental to
countries excluded from association, the difficulties raised are simply not
sufficiently complex to support extensive analysis. 10'
9 Helleinner, Nigeria and the African Common Market, 4 NIGERIAN J. EcoN. &
SoCIAL STUDIES 283, 286-87 (1962).98 The best general survey of the problems and prospects of common markets is
BALA SA, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION (1961). For an excellent classification
of advantages and disadvantages of union see STREETEN, ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 26-77
(1961). See also SANNWALD & STOHLER, ECONOMIC INTEGRATION (1959); JANSSEN, FREE
TRADE PROTECTION AND CUSTOMS UNION (1961).
9 Observer (London), July 30, 1961, p. 4, col. 1, quoted in DELL, TRADE BLOCS AND
COMMON MARKETS 211 (1963). See also Dell, Apreciaciones sobre el funcionamiento
del Tratado de Montevideo, in INTEGRACI6N DE AMbuCA LATINA 94, 112 (Wionczek ed.
1964).
100 See Preferencias Comerciales Norteamericanas para Amirica Latina, 15 COMR-
cio EXTERIOR (MEx.) 5 (1965); Szulc, US. Said To Study Latin-Tariff Plan, N.Y.
Times, March 17, 1965, p. 10, col. 3.
101 For an example of perhaps over-comprehensive coverage see the multi-volume
study SECRETARIAT, ECONOMIC COMM'N FOR EUROPE, IMPLICATIONS FOR TRADE AND
DEVELOPMENT OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES OF ECONOMIC GROUPINGS OF DEVELOPED COUN-
TRIES AND/OR PREFERENTIAL TRADING ARRANGEMENTS, U.N. Doc. Nos. E/CONF.46/31,
31/Add.1 (1964). See also DEP'T OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, PAN AMERICAN UNION, THE
EFFECTS OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY ON THE LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIES
(1962); Economic Comm'n for Latin America, The Achievement of Co-Ordination in
Latin American Trade Policy: Relations With the European Economic Community,
Econ. Bull. Latin Am., Oct. 1962, p. 127; La Necesidad una Politica Comercial Comlin
Latino-Americana, 13 COMERCIO EXTERIOR (MRx.) 77 (1963); Amdrica Latina y la
Comunidad Econdmica Europea, 12 COMERCIO EXTERIOR (MEx.) 651 (1962).
See Convention of Association Between the European Economic Community and
Associated African States, July 20, 1963, translated in 2 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 971
(1963). See Everling, Die Neuregelung des Assoziationsverhaltnisses zwischen der
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Scholarly effort, directed primarily toward events in Western Europe,
has thus been largely exhausted in exploration of effects of combination of
economically advanced states:
"Interest in customs unions and free trade areas has received its greatest
stimulation from recent European experience. The bulk of the discus-
sion, both theoretical and empirical, of the ecnomic advantages and
disadvantages of such customs arrangements has consequently been
geared to the European context. The existing accepted theory of cus-
toms unions, as originnally [sic] formulated by Viner, is therefore of
limited relevance to policy-makers in the 'underdeveloped' world ...
The European situation is one of industrialized market economies, char-
acterized by highly skilled and mobile labor forces, and close trading
interrelationships. Prices at least approximate marginal costs and mar-
ginal social values. In this context, the questions asked by the economist
may legitimately lean frequently towards the neoclassical ones of eco-
nomic efficiency and optimal resource allocation." 102
Unconsidered employment of criteria created for evaluation of the
European Communities in studies of feasibility of integration among eco-
nomically diminutive underdeveloped countries has yielded unwarranted
negative conclusions. Allen, for example, asserts: "[A]n extremely low
level of economic development will tend to keep economic benefits at a
minimum.... [T]he higher the stage of economic development, the greater
is the potential economic gain." 103
B. Amalgamation Rationale
1. Support
Nevertheless, economists in increasing numbers are recognizing the
possibility of integration among backward states as a potential partial solu-
tion, perhaps permitting self-extrication from the difficulties of underdevel-
opment. General Principle Ten established by the United Nations Confer-
ence on Trade and Development recommends: "Regional economic group-
ings, integration or other forms of economic co-operation should be pro-
moted among developing countries as a means of expanding their intra-
regional and extra-regional trade and encouraging their economic growth.
Europiiischen Wirtschaftsgemeinscbaft und den afrikaniscben Staaten und Madagaskar
sowie den iiherseeischen Liindern und Hobeitsgebieten, 24 ZErrsCHRIFT FUR AUSLXNDISCHES
OFFEN-micms REcHT UND V6LKERREmCT 472 (1964); van den Bergh, The New Conven-
tion of Association With African States, I COMMON MKT. L. REv. 156 (1963). See also
Cohen, The Association of Third Countries With the European Economic Community
Pursuant to Article 238, 26 U. Pitt. L. REv. 521 (1965).
'
02 Helleinner, supra note 97, at 285-86. See also Onitiri, Towards a West African
Economic Commmity, 5 NuimuE ' J. EcON. & SoCIAL STUDIES 27 (1963).
103Alen, Integration in Less Developed Areas, 14 KYKLos 315, 319, 329 (1961).
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104 Reynoso, commenting on this declaration, asserts: "[Sie lleg6
finalmente a un consenso de opini6n mundial en el sentido de que los pro-
gramas de integraci6n econtmica ... constituyen un instrumento importante
para el desarrollo econ6mico." 105 Linder believes: "[U]na uni6n aduanera
entre palses subdesarrollados ... tiene a su favor mis argumentos puramente
econtmicos que su contraparte entre los paises industriales." 106 In a burst
of excessive enthusiasm Herrera asserts: "It is certain that without integra-
tion there will be no economic development in Latin America." 107
The United States can be regarded as a convincing example of the value
of common market arrangements.' 08 Certainly perpetuation of preunifica-
tion interstate disharmony would have precluded the rapid economic expan-
sion actually achieved. 09 Intranational European commerce likewise suffered
until relatively recently from domestic impediment. The Trade Treaty of
1786 removed the ban of France on the import of British textiles. A French
observer complained:
"Although English merchandise is subject to duties of 10 per cent or
12 per cent, England can supply nearly all the provinces of the kingdom
more cheaply than can our own industry. Our goods are subject to
customs duties which prevent them from meeting English competition.
It costs from 10 per cent to 12 per cent to send silk gauze, cotton cloth
and velveteen from Lyon to Brittany, and it costs as much to send
Flemish products into the interior of the kingdom. Woolen goods
manufactured in Lille pay 7 Y2 per cent at the bureau in Peronne alone.
The cloth of Languedoc arrives in Paris and in Brittany only after
having paid 15 per cent or 16 per cent in duties and expenses." 110
'
1 4U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Final Act, U.N. Doc. No.
E/CONF.46/L.28, Annex A, at 13 (1964).
105Reynoso, Prdlogo, in INTEGRAci6N DE AMRCA LATINA at xi (Wionczek ed.
1964).
10'Linder, Uniones aduaneras y desarrolo econ6mico, in INumaGcIA6N DE AMELRCA
LATINA 15, 25 (Wionczek ed. 1964).
107 Herrera, The Financing of Latin American Integration, Int'l Development Rev.,
Sept. 1963, p. 7. For a discussion of changes in the attitudes of United States officials
toward the Latin American Free Trade Association see Wionczek, La bistoria del
Tratado de Montevideo, in INmcRAci6N DE AMjIcA LATINA 53, 79-93 (Wionczek ed.
1964).
'
0 8 For critical discussion of the proposition see Dell, Economic Integration and
the American Example, 69 ECoN. J. 39 (1959); Fabricant, Study of the Size and Efficiency
of the American Economy, in ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE SIZE OF NATIONS 35 (E.
A. G. Robinson ed. 1960). See also DEL, TRADE BLOCS AND COMMON MARKETS, at xvi
(1963).
109 "New York attempted to keep out firewood from Connecticut and produce
from New Jersey by imposing heavy duties on those goods; .... New Jersey replied
by placing a prohibitive tax on the Sandy Hook lighthouse, which happened to be on
New Jersey soil, and the town of New London in Connecticut suspended all trade with
New Yorkers." Freund, Foundations and Development of American Federalism, in
FEDERALIsM AND Tmi NEW NATIONS OF AFRICA 153, 155 (Currie ed. 1944).
"10 BosHma, THm SIN=Cn Du r PRojECt: A ST'DY OF ThE MOVEMENT FOR A FRENcm
CUSTOMS UNIoN iN Ttm EIGHTEEN CEN URY 23 (1964).
"Tolls on trade were collected throughout Europe in medieval times .... Tolls
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2. Static Gain
Regardless of its validity, much of traditional analysis cannot serve as
a guide to decision-makers contemplating amalgamation: while it measures
total world utility alteration, they pursue national advantage. Within the
framework of comparative statics Vanek has demonstrated that integration
will normally benefit participating nations.
Posit combination of countries a and b. Assume only two commodities,
x and y, are produced. Let country a trade exclusively with b, exchanging
y for x, while country b, in addition to its trade with a, exports x to and
imports y from the rest of the world. In figure 1 vertical and horizontal
sides of rectangle OaBObA represent joint output by states a and b of goods
x and y respectively. If individual supplies of a and b are calculated from
Oa and Ob, a point such as P will define quantities produced by each. Indif-
ference curves such as u., ub, and U'b may with caution be used to define
community preferences. Amounts exchanged may be measured along axes
Px and Py.
World terms of trade are given by PCb. Before integration country a
imposes an ad valorem duty of _ on imports of good x; similarly, coun-
PPb
try b taxes shipments of good y at a rate C Revenue is distributed
Cb1P
among citizens of the recipient countries. Exchange will equate the marginal
rate of substitution with the internal price ratio in each country: equilibrium
will be reached at points C. and Cb, where price lines PaC and PbCb are
tangent to indifference curves u8 and ub respectively.
If the offer curve of the group of excluded nations is infinitely elastic
and the levy of country b on commondity y is retained in the common ex-
ternal tariff, world terms of trade will remain unchanged on unification
and the internal price ratio of states a and b will equal PbCb. Country a can
achieve a level of satisfaction equivalent to C. at C'. where indifference
curve Ua has the slope of PbCb. So long as C'. falls below and to the right
of k, state b can profit through integration without damage to its partner by
advancing to indifference curve u'b. While possibility of loss cannot be
excluded, gain will result over a wide range of parameter values. Alteration
of world terms of trade would provide additional benefit."'
were established in the first place because they were among the simplest and most
effective of taxes. It was possible to collect them without preparing tax rolls, with
only the most rudimentary kind of assessment, and with the greatest possible cer-
tainty, because travelling merchants were obliged to use roads, rivers and seaports,
and if they could not or would not pay as directed, their goods could be confiscated.
• ..Because of their advantages as a method of taxation, tolls had come to be col-
lected by many different authorities: governments of towns and provinces, feudal
barons on their estates, rulers at the frontiers of their domains and principalities."
Id. at 1.
I" VANEK, GENERAL EQUILIBR1VM OF INTERNATIONAL DisCuMINATION: THE CASE OF
CUSTOMS UNIONS 22-26, 53-87, 97-109 (1965).
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The concept of economies of scale has not been ignored in the major
studies. Viner states: "When a small country by itself, because of the
limited size of its domestic market . . . may be unable to reach a scale of
production large enough to make low unit-costs of production possible,
two or more such countries combined may provide a market large enough.
S. .112 Meade recognizes: "[T]he formation of a customs union is more
likely to raise economic welfare the greater is the scope for economies of
large-scale production ... ." 113
Its importance has nevertheless been minimized. Viner concludes: "It
does not seem probable that the prospects of reduction in unit-costs of
production as the result of enlargement of the tariff area are ordinarily
substantial, even when the individual member countries are quite small.
.. 114 Scitovsky admits that European plants are generally below optimum
size but argues that factors other than market magnitude, for instance ex-
cessive product differentiation and preference for family enterprise, are de-
terminative. He asserts that ignoring the impact of quantitative restrictions
the gains from increases in specialization induced by union among the EEC
states, Scandinavia, and Britain would be "less than one twentieth of one
1 1 2 VINER, THE CUSTOMS UNION ISSUE 45 (1950).
113 MEADE, Ti THEORY OF CUSTOMS UNIONS 110 (1955).
114 ViNE, THE CUSTOMS UNION ISSUE 46 (1950).
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per cent of the gross social product of the countries involved." 115 A mere
one per cent of national income has been held to be the absolute maximum
benefit Britain can derive from membership in the European Free Trade
Association." 6
Much of the projected gain from consolidation of the sheltered markets
of backward nations can nevertheless be attributed to anticipated advan-
tageous exploitation of economies of scale. Brown has strongly criticized the
traditional approach:
"I do not think that most of the theoretical discussion of this subject
helps us much. The treatments of Viner, Meade, Makower and Morton,
Gehrels, and Lipsey . . . are concerned almost entirely with the effects
on economic welfare ... on the assumption that there are no productive
economies of large scale. . . . [I]t takes comparative advantages and
trade-patterns as they are now instead of considering what they are
likely to be, say, a generation hence." 117
Robinson states:
"It is not going too far, perhaps, to say that it seemed to be our general
impression that most of the major industrial economies of scale could
be achieved by a relatively high income nation of 50 million; that
nations of 10-15 million were probably too small to get all the technical
economies available . ".. ,, 118
Carnell asserts: "The economic argument turns largely on the alleged ad-
vantages of the economies of scale." 119
115 SCITOVSKY, ECONOMIC THEORY AND WESTERN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 67, 27-32,
110-35 (1958). An important segment of this volume first appeared as Scitovsky, Eco-
nomies of Scale, Competition, and European Integration, 46 AM. ECON. REV. 71 (1956).
116 Johnson, The Gains From Free Trade With Europe: An Estimate, 26 MAN-
CHESTER SCHOOL ECON. & SOCIAL STUDIES 247 (1958). See Bhambri, Customs Unions and
Underdeveloped Countries, 15 ECONOMIA INTERNAZIONALE 235 (1962).
117 Brown, The Benefits of Regional Economic Integration Among African Coun-
tries, 2 DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH DIG. 77, 78-79 (1963).
118 E. Robinson, Introduction, in ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE SIZE OF NATIONS
at xviii (E. Robinson ed. 1960). Allen argues:
"Some of the smallest nations can afford to have optimum-size, small-scale manu-
facturing facilities. A shoe factory, for example, requires a capital facility valued
at $500,000 to $2 million to operate efficiently. Diversified meat packing requires
an investment of $10 to $20 million, fresh meat packing requires capital of only
$1 million. An optimum-size flour mill has capital requirements of $700,000 to $3.5
million, gypsum products $4 million to $6 million. Many other activities, including
cement, soap, fountain pens, canned fruits and vegetables, tires and tubes need $25
million or less in capital facilities to achieve optimum scale."
Allen, supra note 103, at 322-23. From this data he concludes: "Thus, many manufactur-
ing facilities, primarily light manufacturing and consumer goods are within the market
size of quite small less developed countries and there is no certainty that an increase in
the size of the market would result in significant economies." Id. at 323. This does not
necessarily follow: he has not discussed the capacity of these enterprises but their cost.
Allen then adds: "The question is not always just one of an adequate market but of
attracting investment or allocating resources for investment purposes in the first place."
Ibid. The posited dichotomy is misleading to the extent that market characteristics guide
investment decisions. In any event both prospective demand and capital funds are
required.
1 t 9 Carnell, Political Implications of Federalism in New States, in FFDERALISM AND
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While it has been obvious, at least since Adam Smith's description of a
pin manufacturing plant, that large output permits increased factor effi-
ciency, operationally meaningful general cost-output relationships remain
difficult to quantify. 120 Studies of particular industries provide some relevant
data. In oil production, for example, unit cost of degassing operations de-
clines at least until an output of 300,000 barrels per day is achieved. Because
unit transmission friction varies inversely with pipeline diameter average
petroleum land transportation costs fall until volume reaches approximately
400,000 barrels per day. A refinery with a daily capacity of 500,000 barrels
will have substantial cost advantages over smaller plants. 121 It has been as-
serted that the unit cost of production of a given type of aircraft declines
by over 10 per cent if the model run is increased from 100 to 200 planes.
The purchase price of a single large subsonic jet transport is roughly five
million dollars. 122 Balassa states:
"Over 1 million ingot tons is the annual output of an integrated steel
plant of efficient size, costs are approximately 18 per cent higher at
capacity levels of 0.5 million tons and 33 per cent higher in a plant
producing 0.25 million tons per year. Yet, among less developed coun-
tries, steel production exceeds 1.0 million tons a year only in India,
Brazil, and Mexico .... 2
One plant of minimum optimum size is capable of supplying between 10
and 30 per cent of American typewriter demand. 2
4
ECONOMIC GROWTH IN UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES 16, 21 (Hicks ed. 1961). See Cooper
& Massell, Towards a General Theory of Customs Unions for Developing Countries
(Rand Corp. Paper P-2919, May 1964); Cooper & Massell, Toward a General Theory
of Customs Unions for Developing Countries (Rand Corp. Paper P-2919-1, Sept. 1964).
120 See generally, ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE SIZE OF NATIONS (E. A. G.
Robinson ed. 1960); BANDT, DIMENSION DU MARCiI Er OPTIMUM DE PRODUCTION (1962).
"Statistical evidence bearing on the existence of economies of scale in industry is, for
the most part, sketchy and incomplete, although the logic of the economic and tech-
nical origins of such economies has been extensively developed." Moore, Economies of
Scale: Some Statistical Evidence, 73 Q.J. ECoN. 232 (1959). Generalizing the ".6 rule"
derived by engineers seeking an approximate guide to machine cost as a function of
output, the author inconclusively explores relationships of the form
E = kCa,
where E and C represent capital expenditure and created capacity respectively, k is an
unrestricted constant, and a is a constant having a value between 0 and 1. For strong
support of the rule see Schuman & Alport, Economies of Scale: Some Statistical Evi-
dence: Comment, 74 Q.J. EcoN. 493 (1960). See also Reply, 74 Q.J. EcoN. 497 (1960);
Bruni, Internal Economies of Scale With a Given Technique, 12 J. IND. EcoN. 175
(1964). See generally V. SMITH, INVESTMENT AND PRODUCTION (1961).
121 See LEEMAN, THE PRiCE OF MIDL EAsT OIL: AN EsSAY IN POLITICAL ECONOMY
(1962).
122 See Sturmey, Cost Curves and Pricing in Aircraft Production, 74 ECON. J. 954
(1964).
123 BALASSA, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION 92 (1965).
"[It has been shown that a doubling of the output of ammonia involves a 40 per
cent increase in labor costs and 81 per cent rise in capital costs, while the relevant
figures for ammonium nitrate and ammonium sulphate-the two most important
types of fertilizers-are 27 and 68 per cent, and 20 and 65 per cent, respectively."
Id. at 91. See BALASSA, op. cit. supra note 98, at 139.
124 Bain, Economies of Scale, Concentration, and the Condition of Entry in Twenty
Manufacturing Industries, 44 AM. EcoN. REv. 15, 23 (1954).
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Although frequently useful as crude approximations, more comprehen-
sive studies of scale economies are seldom reliable. From the distribution of
median plant sizes in Great Britain, for example, analysts have derived a list
.of goods which cannot be efficiently manufactured in quantities demanded
by the Uganda population but can be produced at reasonable cost for the
entire East African market: included are canvas, lace, wood crates, paper,
scientific instruments, tools, hats, bicycles, paints, and linen.1 25 There is,
however, little reason to conclude that the median British factory is of
minimum optimal size: it may be larger if constant returns prevail over a
significant portion of the production function; on the other hand, intra-
industry specialization could lead to underestimation. 126
Although exact measurement of potential benefit must await future
empirical analysis, an extreme example of limitation of entrepreneurial op-
portunity through market size restriction can provide qualitative illustration
of argument thrust. On February 18, 1965, Gambia became the thirty-
seventh independent state of Africa. This new nation, comprising 300,000
persons inhabiting a territory 200 miles long and between 15 and 30 miles
wide, has been called by a former British Governor-General "a geographic
and economic absurdity." Although peanuts are its only cash crop,127
additional income is obtained through smuggling cigarettes into surrounding
Senegal: Gambia imports over a million packs per day. Colonial diversifica-
tion efforts proved unsuccessful: "A mining scheme failed (no minerals);
an ambitious shark fishery collapsed (no demand). The British government
put 2,000,000 dollars into a model poultry farm . . . but . . . after a
production of 40,000 eggs-at $50 an egg-the farm was transformed into
a teacher's college." 128 "British aid now amounts to $2,240,000 for develop-
ment projects, plus $748,000 to meet a recurrent budget deficit." 129 An
approximation of Gambian national income may be derived through multi-
125 See Brown, Economic Separatism Versus a Common Market in Developing
Countries, 13 YORKSHIRE BULL. EcoN. & SOCIAL RESEARCH 33 (1961).
126 See Massell, East African Economic Union: An Evaluation and Some Implica-
tions for Policy (Rand Corp. Memo. RM-3880-RC, Dec. 1963).
"[WIhile this method may be applicable in the case of homogeneous commodities,
such as cement, it leads to misleading results in regard to cotton textiles, footwear
and other consumer and producer goods where product differentiation is prevalent.
In the latter instances, the efficient operation of a median British plant presupposes
its integration into an industry manufacturing heterogeneous products with individual
plants specializing in different varieties of the same commodity. Thus, while the
consumption of footwear in an underdeveloped country might equal the production
of a median British plant, efficient operation could still not be ensured in such a
country since its only plant would have to produce all kinds of footwear in use
rather than one or two varieties."
BALASSA, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION 88-89 (1965). "[l~t can be held
that Professor Brown underestimates-mainly by implication, but to some extent also
explicitly-the order of size which an economy has to reach before the limitations of
small scale cease to be a serious obstacle to its further development." Elkan, How To
Beat Backwash: The Case for Customs-Drawback Unions, 75 EcoN. J. 44 (1965).
127 Gambia "was developed as a peanut colony." Gambia Becomes Independent,
Asia & Afr. Rev, March 1965, p. 7.
-~ Time, Feb. 26, 1965, pp. 32, 35.
129 N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1966, p. 42, col. 1.
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plication of population by 113 dollars, the African average per capita earn-
ings in 1960.130 The result, roughly 34 million dollars, could hardly be said to
provide a market base capable of supporting a spectrum of optimal firms.
At the very least one may feel certain that cars and trucks will be imported
for the foreseeable future: the minimum annual output value required for
efficient production in the American automobile industry is conservatively
estimated to be in excess of one billion dollars.' 3 '
4. Dynamic Benefit
We have found industrialization generally necessary for growth: both
import substitution and export of even partially finished goods normally
require manufacturing facilities. Although temporary tariff protection to
infant industries 132 may be justified by benefit derived from generation of
external economies, 133 especially from development of worker skills,13 4 con-
tinued excess of domestic production costs over world supply prices entails
heavy sacrifice of real income by the community. Forced adoption of in-
efficient techniques may squander scarce investment funds by raising capital-
output ratios without concomitantly increasing profit.
Admittedly, iron ore can be mined only at deposit sites and orange
130 U.N. DEP'T OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, WORLD ECONOMIC SURVEY 1963
pt. I, U.N. Doc. No. E/3908(ST/ECA/84), at 21 (1964).
13 1 BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION 76 (1956). See also Weiss, An Evaluation
of Mergers in Six Industries, 47 REV. EcoN. & STATISTICS 172, 176 (1965). For significant
lower British estimates see Brems, Cost and Indivisibility, 12 J. IND. EcoN. 142, 149 (1964).
The problem of inadequate internal markets currently confronts almost all developing
states: among them gross national product exceeds $7 billion only in India, Brazil,
Mexico, and Pakistan. BALASSA, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION 80 (1965).
132 See Myint, Infant Industry Arguments for Assistance to Industries in the Setting
of Dynamic Trade Theory, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE THEORY IN A DEVELOPING WORLD
173 (Harrod & Hague eds. 1963).
133See Bardhan, External Economies, Economic Development, and the Theory
of Protection, 16 OxFoRD ECON. PAPERS 40 (1964); Bardhan, Factor Market Disequili-
brium and the Theory of Protection, 16 OxFOR ECON. PAPERS 375 (1964). For a good
review of recent studies see Mishan, Reflections on Recent Developments in the Concept
of External Effects, 31 CANADIAN J. ECON. & POL. SCL 1 (1965).
134 See note 20 supra.
"It was early observed by aeronautical engineers ... that the number of labor-hours
expended in the production of an airframe . . . is a decreasing function of the
total number of airframes of the same type previously produced. Indeed, the rela-
tionship is remarkably precise; to produce the Nth airframe of a given type, count-
ing from the inception of production, the amount of labor required is proportional
to N-1 13 ....
"Lundberg . . . has given the name 'Horndal effect' to a very similar phenomenon.
The Horndal iron works in Sweden had no new investment (and therefore pre-
sumably no significant change in its methods of production) for a period of 15
years, yet productivity (output per manhour) rose on the average close to 2%
per annum."
Arrow, The Economic Implications of Learning by Doing, 29 REV. ECON. STUDIES 155,
156 (1962). See Sturmey, supra note 122.
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groves would not prove profitable to the inhabitants of Greenland; never-
theless many goods can be created or processed with advantage near their
consumption points. Factor endowments are not divinely decreed constants.
In backward regions a primary problem is the lack of a protected market
sufficiently large to absorb the output of a plant of minimum optimum size.
Euphoric dreams of shortrun export potential will seldom evoke the capital
needed to build from the beginning beyond even extrapolated domestic
demand: normally comparative advantage will at least initially lie elsewhere,
and subsidization permitting invasion of sheltered foreign markets would
appear unjustifiable.
Economic union among Gambia and neighboring African states would
immeasurably ameliorate its presently poor prospects of future economic
viability. Expansion of the protected market would spur domestic entre-
preneurial activity by significantly extending opportunities for rational in-
dustrialization. Local establishment of tire producing facilities on a scale
sufficient to supply the demand of the entire integrated area, for example,
would permit both economic autonomous satisfaction of internal needs and
conservation of foreign exchange through barter of excess output for other
vital manufactures similarly supplied by partner states.
Postulation of differing production functions among potential union
members allows support of regional arrangements involving underdeveloped
states even under assumptions of constant costs. If Gambia and Senegal can
respectively supply tires and textiles with comparative advantage, traditional
arguments of trade theory demonstrate that international specialization and
concomitant exchange will raise real income in both states. Differences in
cost structure among prospective partners are, however, likely to be the
result of politically undesirable development disparities, which specialization
would only aggravate. 3 5
III. CONCLUSION
Low saving ratios and limited export potential restrict growth of back-
ward states and impede politically necessary narrowing of international
income differentials. Examination of European amalgamation potential in
the context of traditional trade theory induced advocation of the common
market primarily as a device of advantage to groupings of advanced nations.
In recent years, lack of alternative development opportunities has neverthe-
less focused attention on integration as a partial solution to third world
expansion problems. Regional combination can stimulate industrialization
through provision of protected markets sufficiently broad to permit scale
economies. Intraunion specialization allows acquisition by participants of
required imports without foreign exchange expenditure.
135 See Cooper & Massell, Towards a General Theory of Customs Unions for
Developing Countries (Rand Corp. Paper P-2919, May 1964); Cooper & Massell, To-
ward a General Theory of Customs Unions for Developing Countries (Rand Corp.
Paper P-2919-l, Sept. 1964).
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